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INTRODUCTION 
The terms “cybersquatting,” “ACPA,” “UDRP,” and “reverse 
domain name hijacking” are becoming less obscure and esoteric 
and are not longer restricted to professional jargon used solely by 
Internet and trademark law specialists.  In the last few years, 
numerous news and magazine articles, as well as professional and 
academic publications, introduced the phenomenon of 
cybersquatting, described the tools formulated to combat it and 
touched upon some problematic aspect in this rapidly developing 
field.  This Article analyzes one of the most concerning aspects of 
U.S. cybersquatting law: foreign actors litigating domain name 
disputes in U.S. federal courts.  This problem surfaced and 
received special attention in the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona.1 
Part I of this Article provides essential background to domain 
name dispute issues.  Part II describes the legal framework created 
to deal with cybersquatting activities, namely the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy.  Part III provides an overview on the 
background and facts surrounding the Barcelona.com domain 
name dispute and the Fourth Circuit’s ruling.  Part IV consists of a 
critical analysis of the decision and discussion of its resulting 
troublesome consequences.  Finally, Part V presents an alternative 
to current cybersquatting policy and approaches.  In addition, it 
provides a new model that highlights the advantages of the 
alternative as compared with the shortcomings of the present 
approaches. 
 
1 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES 
A discussion of the issues raised by international domain name 
disputes requires some background knowledge about the Internet 
and the law that affects it.  Along with a cursory overview on the 
Internet and domain name structure, this part includes an 
introduction to the relevant jurisdictional issues, a discussion of the 
tension between domain name rules and trademark law, and a 
survey of the pre-regulation landscape. 
A. Internet and Domain Names Architecture 
The Internet is a giant “network of networks” facilitating 
communication and information transfer between the millions of 
computers connected to it.2  The domain name system (“DNS”), 
the addressing mechanism of the Internet, is designed in a 
hierarchal structure.3  Internet addresses consist of alphanumeric 
strings separated by a dot (.), e.g., <news.google.com>, and are 
read from left (the lower level of the domain) to right (the higher 
level of the domain).4  Theoretically, there is a highest-level 
domain at the apex of the domain name space, the “root domain,” 
which is usually left unnamed, under which all domains fall.5 
Below the root domain are top-level domains (“TLDs”), which 
are the highest level of named domains and the part of the address 
to the extreme right.6  Top-level domains, in turn, are divided into 
two major categories:7 generic top-level domains (“gTLDs”) and 
 
2 For a detailed explanation of the Internet, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830–
38 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
3 The domain name system (“DNS”) basically correlates the numerical IP addresses 
assigned to all computers or “hosts” connected to the Internet (addresses that can be 
recognized by computers) and alphabetical strings of characters entered into the search 
tool in the user’s browser (addresses that can be more easily remembered by users).  For 
a description of the DNS, see Orion Armon, Is This as Good as It Gets?  An Appraisal of 
ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) Three Years After 
Implementation, 22 REV. LITIG. 99, 101–03 (2003). 
4 See Kim G. von Arx & Gregory R. Hagen, Sovereign Domains: A Declaration of 
Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 11 (2002), at 
http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v9i1/article4.html. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. ¶ 12. 
7 A third category of top level domains (“TLDs”) is an infrastructure TLD (“iTLD”) 
called <.arpa>, which is used solely for Internet infrastructure purposes. See id. ¶ 12. 
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country-code top-level domains (“ccTLDs”).8  Thus, in the domain 
name <www.yahoo.com>, the top-level domain is <.com>.  The 
string of characters <yahoo> is the second-level domain (“SLD”) 
registered in the top-level registry <.com> file zone.9 
Those TLD servers catalogue domain names registered under 
all the ccTLDs and gTLDs.10  The TLD servers communicate with 
other servers containing second-level registrations such as 
<yahoo>.  In fact, there is no single computer containing the entire 
database of all domain names, since the TLD servers are located in 
“myriad locations worldwide.”11 
In the 1980s, seven gTLDs were introduced,12 three of which 
could be registered without restrictions (<.com>, <.net>, and 
<.org>).13  Later, four additional non-restricted gTLDs were 
created (<.biz>, <.info>, <.name>, and <.pro>).14  Presently, six of 
 
8 See Colby B. Springer, Master of the Domain (Name): A History of Domain Name 
Litigation and the Emergence of the Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 315, 
320–23 (2001) (explaining the TLD structure and registration procedure). 
9 Every generic TLD (“gTLD”) has only one registry.  A registry is the entity that 
stores, manages, and maintains the entire list of second level domains (“SLDs”) 
registered under that gTLD.  The registry is also responsible for licensing commercial 
registrars, which sell available SLDs to consumers. See Cable News Network, LP v. 
CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter CNN I], 
vacated in part on other grounds by Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, No. 02-
1112, 2003 WL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter CNN Appeal]; see also 
Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker In Cyberspace: A Power Model, 27 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 859, 870–71 (2002) (describing the hierarchal structure of the DNS). 
10 Armon, supra note 3, at 102 (describing the hierarchy of the root servers, TLD 
servers and sub-level domain directories). 
11 See Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: 
Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
989, 1019 (2002). 
12 These gTLDs were: <.com>, <.edu>, <.gov>, <.int>, <.mil>, <.net>, and <.org>. See 
ICANN, Top-Level Domains, at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) 
[hereinafter Top-Level Domains]. 
13 Id.  Unrestricted gTLDs are ones that are not restricted to certain institutions or 
subjects.  Examples of restricted gTLDs are <.gov> (restricted to the U.S. government), 
<.edu> (restricted to academic institutions), and <.mil> (restricted to the U.S. military). 
See Armon, supra note 3, at 103–04. 
14 See Top-Level Domains, supra note 12. 
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these seven gTLD registries are physically located in U.S. 
territory.15 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(“ICANN”), a not-for-profit organization, is responsible for the 
maintenance and management of the gTLD directories by virtue of 
an exclusive contract with the U.S. government.16  The 
administration of the ccTLD registries such as <.ca> for Canada, 
<.fr> for France, and <.uk> for the United Kingdom, however, is 
“controlled by the corresponding national government[s].”17 
B. Introduction to Territorial18 Jurisdictional Issues 
In the context of international jurisdictional law, it is useful to 
distinguish between three types of jurisdictional powers: 
jurisdiction to prescribe (sometimes called legislative 
jurisdiction),19 jurisdiction to adjudicate (sometimes called judicial 
 
15 Id.  It appears that the <.name> registry, based in London, is the only registry located 
outside of the United States. See Global Name Registry, at http://www.nic.name (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2003) (official Web site of the <.name> registry). 
16 See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route 
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 50–93 (2000) (describing the 
contractual relationship between the U.S. government and the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) and providing detailed background on the 
creation and functions of ICANN); see also Katherine Meyers, Note, Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution in U.S. Courts: Should ICANN Be Given Deference?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
1177, 1183–86 (2002) (describing the functions of ICANN). 
17 See Lisa M. Sharrock, Note, The Future of Domain Name Dispute Resolution: 
Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions from Within the UDRP Framework, 51 
DUKE L.J. 817, 840–01 (2001) (noting that unlike domain names with generic TLDs, 
administration of each country code TLD (“ccTLD”) is controlled by the corresponding 
national government); see also von Arx & Hagen, supra note 4, ¶ 20 (noting that the U.S. 
government policy was to give national governments authority to manage or establish 
policy for their own ccTLDs). 
18 In rem and in personam jurisdictions are sometimes categorized as “territorial 
jurisdictions,” as distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction.  “For a person or 
property to be subject to a particular court’s jurisdiction, there must be a proper 
connection between the person or property and the sovereign state in whose name the 
court acts.” FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. FleetBostonFinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 
129 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing 16 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.01 (Matthew Bender 
3d ed.)).  The terms personal jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction are used 
interchangeably this Article. 
19 Jurisdiction to prescribe is a state’s authority to make its laws applicable to the 
“activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things . . . .” 
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jurisdiction),20 and jurisdiction to enforce (sometimes called 
executive jurisdiction).21  The power and authority of a state to 
legislate, adjudicate, and enforce its national law in the 
international sphere are traditionally subject to constraints of 
territoriality, nationality, and effect.22  Thus, every state has the 
obligation to exercise moderation and restraint in invoking 
jurisdiction over cases involving foreign elements.23  The Internet, 
providing a global and border-free platform for communication, 
information, and various commercial activities, challenges 
traditional concepts of jurisdiction. 
1. In Personam Jurisdiction24 
Since in personam jurisdiction determines when a defendant is 
subject to adjudicative process of the court, it is closely related to 
the judicial jurisdiction concept and its general limitations.  The 
rule in any inquiry into whether a state can subject a person or a 
thing25 to the process of its courts is the rule of “reasonableness.”26  
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) 
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. 
20 Jurisdiction to adjudicate is a state’s authority “to subject persons or things to the 
process of its courts or administrative tribunals . . . .” Id. § 401(b). 
21 Jurisdiction to enforce is a state’s authority “to induce or compel compliance or to 
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations . . . .” Id. § 401(c). 
22 Id. § 401 cmt. a (noting that a state’s different jurisdictional powers each have 
different limitations under international law); see also Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, 
International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 
FED. COMM. L.J. 117 (Dec. 1997) (describing the application of international law 
principles on jurisdictional concepts), available at http://www.law.indiana.edu-
/fclj/pubs/v50/no1/wilske.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). 
23 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Calif., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (“‘Great 
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction 
into the international field.’” (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
24 This overview of in personam jurisdiction is based on material in a previous article 
by this author. See Zohar Efroni, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and 
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy: New Opportunities for International Forum 
Shopping?, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 335, 339–41 (2003). 
25 This rule is also relevant to in rem jurisdiction. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing 
principles of in rem jurisdiction). 
26 “A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a 
person or thing if the relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the 
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.” RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra 
note 19, § 421(1). 
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U.S. courts,27 considering whether to assert personal jurisdiction, 
generally look at two elements: the long-arm statute in the 
jurisdiction at issue and the due process requirement of the U.S. 
Constitution.28  Personal jurisdiction may be divided into two 
types: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.  General 
jurisdiction is applicable when the defendant has engaged in 
“‘systematic and continuous activities’ in the forum state.”29  In 
this instance, the plaintiff does not have to show a connection 
between the forum-related activities of the foreign party and the 
cause of action. 
In the context of jurisdiction arising out of online activity, the 
systematic and continuous contacts are often absent.  Specific 
jurisdiction, however, which does not require systematic and 
continuous contacts, may apply if the cause of action is related to 
the foreign party’s activity in the forum state.  The power to assert 
personal jurisdiction, however, was discussed in Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.30  Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion in the Asahi case stated that a court could subject 
a corporation to suit in a state only if the defendant took an action 
“purposefully directed” toward the forum state.31  The mere 
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, 
is not such an act; the defendant must take additional action to 
indicate the “intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum 
state”—advertising, for example.32 
 
27 Most of the cases described in this subsection decided domestic U.S. disputes, in 
which the question was which U.S. state had personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  U.S. 
personal jurisdiction concepts, however, are also applicable to international disputes. 
28 See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Calif., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (stating that personal 
jurisdiction depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an 
action has been brought and a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum 
state to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum). 
29 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16 
(1984)). 
30 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
31 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
32 Id. The Supreme Court, however, has not yet resolved this issue. See id. at 116–21 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing against the “purposeful availment” requirement).  
Thus, in the Internet context, the applicable threshold for on-line activity that establishes 
personal jurisdiction was not definitively determined in the Asahi decision. 
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Generally, courts apply a three-prong test for asserting specific 
jurisdiction.  The plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant 
purposefully availed himself or herself of the privileges and 
liabilities of the jurisdictions by conducting activities specific to 
the jurisdiction,33 which is a version of the traditional “minimum 
contacts” test;34 (2) the cause of action arises from those 
activities;35 and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable in the 
circumstances.36 
The first prong of this test is the hardest to clarify in the 
context of online activities.  Courts were generally reluctant to 
extend personal jurisdiction merely because the defendant operated 
a Web site that was accessible from the forum state.  In this 
context, courts tended to follow Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Asahi.37  Consequently, a sliding scale was developed, providing 
that the more commercially oriented the Web site is and the more it 
is engaged in direct commercial activities targeting the forum state, 
the more the defendant is susceptible to the forum state’s 
jurisdiction.38  The two ends of the sliding scale proved relatively 
easy to identify.  On one end, a purely passive Web site generally 
would not establish personal jurisdiction.39  If a defendant was 
“doing business” through the Web site with individuals in the 
 
33 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  The test was later articulated in 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
34 The “minimum contacts” test was first established in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
35 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). 
36 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 
Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)).  The role of the reasonableness as 
a balancing factor is explained in Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. 
37 See, e.g., Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418; Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 
295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). 
38 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997) (“[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that 
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the 
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.  This 
sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
39 A typical example was Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), in which the Web site contained only general informative text about the 
Blue Note club in Missouri, and the famous Blue Note jazz club in New York claimed 
infringement. 
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forum state, however, courts were generally willing to assert 
jurisdiction.40  The difficult cases lay in the middle, cases in which 
the Web site was interactive but still did not amount to clearly 
doing business with the forum state.  Some courts demanded a 
certain threshold of interactivity and “something more” than mere 
advertising in order to establish jurisdiction.41  Other courts 
considered whether to extend their jurisdictional reach based on 
the totality of contacts of defendant with the forum state, with and 
without regard to the Internet activities.42 
Recently, courts have started using an additional tool to expand 
personal jurisdiction in Internet-related activities known as the 
“effects doctrine.”  The three basic components of the doctrine, 
which grants the forum state jurisdiction over a foreign actor, are: 
(1) an intentional action, (2) which is expressly aimed toward the 
forum-state’s jurisdiction, (3) causing harm that occurred in that 
jurisdiction when that actor knew it might occur.43  Examples of 
applying this test to online activities can be found mostly in 
Internet-based defamation cases44 and in cases decided before the 
ACPA’s enactment,45 in which proving “purposeful availment” by 
the defendant was problematic. 
Undoubtedly, the increase in activities—commercial and 
otherwise—on the Internet introduced new and difficult questions 
 
40 See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(asserting jurisdiction on a Texas defendant, whose contacts with the forum state 
consisted almost exclusively of selling software through computer transmissions to 
CompuServe’s system in Ohio). 
41 See, e.g., Millennium Enters. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920–23 
(D. Or. 1999) (introducing the requirement of a “deliberate action” in the forum state). 
42 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56–57 (D.D.C. 1998). 
43 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984) (establishing an “effects” test for 
intentional action aimed at the forum state). 
44 See, e.g., Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999).  In Bochan, a 
Virginia resident brought an Internet defamation lawsuit in the Eastern District of 
Virginia against residents of Texas and Missouri. Id. at 694–95.  Denying the defendants’ 
jurisdictional challenge to the court’s jurisdiction, the court stated that “because the 
predominant ‘effects’ of the La Fontaines’ and Harris’s conduct are in Virginia, these 
defendants could reasonably foresee being haled into court in this jurisdiction.” Id. at 702 
(quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90). 
45 See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the 
“effects doctrine” in a classic pre-Anticybersqatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) 
cybersquatting case). 
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for U.S. courts deciding personal jurisdiction issues.  The tests 
applied and the results that followed differed from case to case 
depending, inter alia, on the specific long-arm statute involved and 
each court’s interpretation of the concepts of “purposeful 
availment” and “interactive online activity” sufficient for 
exercising personal jurisdiction.46  For purposes of this Article, 
however, it is important to be aware of the new problems 
encountered by plaintiffs attempting to hail into court cyber-
defendants and the potential expansion of personal jurisdiction 
when the allegedly unlawful act occurred “everywhere and 
nowhere at the same time.”47 
2. In Rem Jurisdiction 
In rem jurisdiction facilitates legal action against the thing (or 
the res) itself,48 with legal actions commenced in the judicial situs 
where the thing is located.49  Hence, the application of the rule of 
“reasonableness” in this context requires the res to be located in 
the territorial jurisdiction of the court and to have some relevancy 
to the dispute.50  The three types51 of in rem jurisdictions are: (1) 
 
46 As of today, there is no ruling by the Supreme Court that resolves the different 
approaches of several circuits regarding certain questions of personal jurisdiction. See 
Springer, supra note 8, at 334. 
47 See Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property 
Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 911, 935–46 (1997) (describing the difficulties of asserting jurisdiction in 
Internet-related activities). 
48 In rem is defined as “in or against the thing.” BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 453 (2d ed. 1990). 
49 “In rem jurisdiction is predicated on the notion that the res is found within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court.” FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. FleetBostonFinancial.com, 
138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D. Mass. 2001). 
50 One court explained: 
In order for a court to act with authority to hear a dispute and render a judgment 
that will justify recognition, the court must have jurisdiction not only over the 
subject matter of the suit, but also over the person or property to whom or 
which the court’s judgment will extend . . . .  For a person or property to be 
amenable to a particular court’s jurisdiction, there must be a proper connection 
between the person or property and the sovereign in whose name the court acts. 
Id. at 129 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
51 Id. at 132 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (noting the three 
types of in rem jurisdiction)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS     
§ 222 topic 2 (1971). 
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true in rem, which arises when courts adjudicate property rights 
over the thing vis-à-vis the world;52 (2) quasi in rem I, in which 
property rights are allocated as against particular named persons;53 
and (3) quasi in rem II, which concerns the rights of a particular 
person or persons in a thing, but is distinguishable from quasi in 
rem I because the claim giving rise to the action “is not related to 
the res that provides jurisdiction.”54 
In making these distinctions, a continuing source of 
controversy is the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Shaffer v. 
Heitner.55  The Shaffer court held that the mere statutory presence 
of a defendant’s property in a state—without any other ties among 
the defendant, the state, and the litigation—could not support 
jurisdiction over the defendants in that state.56  Some courts 
believe that Shaffer requires minimum contacts analysis in 
exercising any type of in rem jurisdiction,57 while other courts 
interpreted Shaffer as compelling such a test only in quasi in rem II 
cases.58 
This somewhat obscure issue regained new, fascinating life in 
the context of domain names.  In rem jurisdiction could be an 
effective response to evasive cybersquatters avoiding personal 
jurisdiction, but the prospect of invoking in rem jurisdiction raises 
some difficult questions.  For instance, do domain names constitute 
 
52 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 246 n.12. 
53 See Fleetboston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 132.  Examples include actions to remove a 
cloud on title to land or actions seeking to quiet title against a particular rival’s claim. Id. 
54 Id.  In a quasi in rem II action, “the plaintiff does not dispute the property rights of 
the owner of the res, but seeks to obtain the res in satisfaction of some separate claim.” 
Id. 
55 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
56 See id. at 209. 
57 For instance, the district court in Fleetboston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134, found that the 
Shaffer holding is not limited to quasi in rem type II actions: 
The logic of Shaffer’s limitations would appear to extend to actions in which 
the existence of the property in the state cannot fairly be said to represent 
meaningful contacts between the forum state, the defendant, and the litigation.  
While this will generally be type II quasi in rem actions, it will not be so 
exclusively. 
Id. 
58 See, e.g., CNN I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489–92 (E.D. Va. 2001) (adopting a limited 
reading of Shaffer and citing many other authorities supporting this interpretation), aff’d 
in relevant part by CNN Appeal, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003). 
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the necessary res to qualify for in rem jurisdiction?  If yes, in 
which territory do they “exist”?  Also, are minimum contacts with 
the forum required for exercising such jurisdiction?59 
C. The Intersection of Trademark Law and Domain Name 
Disputes60 
The friction between trademark law and domain names is a 
well-acknowledged problem and an inevitable outgrowth of the 
Internet and particularly of online commercial activities.  The clash 
mainly arises because traditional trademark law was not designed 
and did not contemplate, ab initio, trademark disputes occurring 
purely in a global, electronic medium such as the Internet.  In 
particular, the uniqueness and global reach of domain names serve 
to complicate the application of traditional trademark concepts. 
1. The Basic Tension 
When the use of marks incorporated in domain names 
increased through the 1990s as a tool of mark owners to promote 
their commercial activities, the basic tension between trademark 
law and domain names surfaced and intensified.  There are two 
parts to this problem.  First, there is similarity between marks and 
domain names as potential identifiers with the capacity to 
distinguish between sources of goods and services.  Second, the 
nature and purpose of trademarks and domain names is 
conceptually different.  As a branch of commercial competition 
law, trademark protection—at least under U.S. law—is primarily 
designed to facilitate distinctions between sources of goods or 
services in order to prevent confusion among consumers and to 
protect the goodwill of the mark.61  Conversely, the domain name 
 
59 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
60 The discussion about the conflict between trademark and domain name concepts is 
based on material included in a previous article by the author. See Efroni, supra note 24, 
at 342–46. 
61 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Two 
goals of trademark law are reflected in the federal scheme.  On the one hand, the law 
seeks to protect consumers who have formed particular associations with a mark.  On the 
other hand, trademark law seeks to protect the investment in a mark made by the owner.” 
(citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995))); see also 74 
AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 1 (2001) (“The purpose of trademark law is 
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system was merely meant to coordinate easy-to-remember strings 
of letters and hard-to-memorize strings of numbers.  Domain 
names were not meant to function as trademarks; they were 
thought to be simply a feature in the system of addresses 
corresponding with “locations” in cyberspace.62 
Trademark law, however, is designed both to protect the 
goodwill of the mark and to prevent consumer confusion.63  
Therefore, identical or similar marks may generally coexist for 
different classes of goods and services under the assumption that 
there is no danger of confusion.64  Moreover, because trademark 
law is territorial,65 the mark may be protected only in the sovereign 
giving effect to the mark, generally after determination that the 
mark qualifies as an identifier of goods and/or services within the 
territory of that sovereign.66  Thus, trademark law can conceptually 
tolerate identical or similar marks in different territories within the 
same classes of goods and services, typically according to separate 
 
to protect the public from confusion regarding the sources of goods or services and to 
protect business from the diversion of trade through the misrepresentation or 
appropriation of another’s goodwill.” (citing Minneapple Co. v. Normandin, 338 N.W.2d 
18, 22 (Minn. 1983))). 
62 See Assafa Endeshaw, The Threat of Domain Names to the Trademark System, 3 J. 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 323, 323 (2000) (“The initial purpose of domain names was to 
assign a unique address to a computer connected to a network.”). 
63 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(outlining a series of nonexclusive factors likely to be relevant in determining the 
likelihood of confusion). 
64 A major exception is famous marks.  The Lanham Act protects famous marks against 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).  Dilution 
is defined as “lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish 
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of . . . [the] likelihood of 
confusion, mistake or deception.” Id. § 1127. 
65 See, e.g., Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The 
concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country 
solely according to that country’s statutory scheme.”) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
66 See Endeshaw, supra note 62, at 324 (explaining that marks normally can have legal 
effect only in the specific territory where they are registered, or, in cases of non-
registered marks, where they established themselves).  Some famous marks, however, are 
protected beyond strictly defined territory. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:4 (2003) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS]. 
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legal schemes giving effect to such marks.67  Domain names, by 
contrast, are both unique and global in nature.  Only one entity in 
the world can obtain the right to use a specific domain name, and 
that domain name that can be accessed globally.68 
2. The Prehistory of Cybersquatting Regulation 
When mark owners started to realize the commercial power 
and value of incorporating their marks in domain names, it was 
sometimes too late.  The domain name registration system was not 
interested in trademark rights and supplied registrations to whoever 
was willing to pay the appropriate fee on a “first come, first 
served” basis.69  Some of the “early bird” registrants did not have 
any rights to the marks.  When this led to wholesale registrations 
of domain names by registrants who held the domain names “for 
ransom,”70 mark owners decided to fight back against these 
cybersquatting activities.71  Early on, the most effective tools in the 
U.S. legal system to combat cybersquatting were traditional 
trademark and unfair competition law and the relatively new 
 
67 The territoriality doctrine, however, under which a trademark is recognized as having 
a separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally 
recognized, has been criticized as “obsolete in a world market where information 
products like computer programs cannot be located at a particular spot on the globe.” 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 66, § 29:1, at 29-4 to -6. 
68 Technically, it is more accurate to say that only one registrant may have exclusive 
rights in a certain SLD (such as <yahoo>) under a certain TLD (such as <.com>). See, 
e.g., Frankel, supra note 9, at 870–72 (noting the uniqueness of a domain name and 
describing the significance of that uniqueness). 
69 See A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes 
and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 620 (2002) (noting that “registration of 
SLDs in the three existing gTLDs (.com, .org, and .net) and in the ccTLDs which emulate 
them, is on a first-come, first-served basis”). 
70 One court described cybersquatting as “the registration as domain names of well-
known trademarks by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the 
trademark owners . . . who not infrequently have been willing to pay ‘ransom’ in order to 
get ‘their names’ back.” See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 
489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5–7 (1999) and S. REP. NO. 
106-140, at 4–7 (1999)). 
71 Generally, cybersquatting is referred to as the unlawful registration of domain names 
incorporating trademarks in which others have rights.  One Senate report defined 
cybersquatting as “the deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of Internet domain 
names in violation of the rights of trademark owners.” S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999). 
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Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”),72 the latter of which 
was incorporated into the U.S. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham 
Act”).73 
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act74 protects registered mark 
owners against the use of their trademarks in cases of likelihood of 
confusion as to the source of the goods and services.  This 
protection was sometimes hard to implement in cases of 
cybersquatting because many cybersquatters never tried to confuse 
consumers as to the source of any goods or services.  Often, the 
cybersquatter never posted anything on the Web site because the 
intention was eventually to sell the domain name for profit to the 
mark holder.75  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act76 protects mark 
owners—including non-registered marks—against false 
advertising and confusion as to the source, sponsorship, and 
affiliation of goods and services.  In both cases, the hallmarks of 
trademark protection are in the concepts of “likelihood of 
confusion”77 and “use in commerce.”78 
 
72 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). 
73 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000). 
74 Id. § 1114(1). 
75 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names, 10 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 231, 245 (2000) (“The usual cybersquatter has 
no interest in using the domain name to identify a website. The cybersquatter typically 
wants only to warehouse the name and deprive the legitimate owner of its use, releasing it 
only for a fee.”). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
77 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (stating 
that trademark law protects consumers from a likelihood of confusion as to the source of 
products, and also assures that mark owners will reap the financial benefits of products 
bearing their marks); Anahid Chalikian, Comment, Cybersquatting, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & 
PRAC. 106, 107 (2001) (stating that the hallmark of any trademark infringement or false 
advertising claim is the likelihood of confusion). 
78 For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) indicates that only trademarks “used in 
commerce” can register in the U.S. principal register.  In an Intent to Use (“ITU”) 
application for registration in the principal registrar, the applicant must give a formal 
statement of his or her “bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.” Id. § 
1051(b)(3)(B).  In addition, an ITU applicant must supply a “verified statement that the 
mark is in use in commerce” within six months after the date of the notice of allowance. 
Id. § 1051(d)(1).  Use in commerce by the defendant is also a prerequisite for filing a 
civil action against unlawful competing use under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
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Because of the complications in applying traditional trademark 
concepts to prevent cybersquatting, the more popular tool was the 
FTDA, which provides injunctive relief to owners of famous marks 
against dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.79  Dilution 
may occur either as a result of “blurring” or “tarnishment” of the 
famous mark.80  The benefit for mark owners under the FTDA was 
that they did not have to prove likelihood of consumer confusion in 
dilution claims.81  Nevertheless, the use in commerce requirement 
remains intact.82 
In applying traditional trademark law tests or trademark 
dilution principles in cybersquatting cases, the first question is 
whether incorporation of the mark in a domain name constituted 
unlawful trademark infringement or dilution.83  In analyzing this 
issue, courts tried to incorporate trademark and dilution concepts 
into domain name disputes, recognizing the dual purpose of 
 
79 Id. § 1125(c); see also Jason R. Edgecombe, Comment, Off The Mark: Bringing the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act in Line with Established Trademark Law, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1247 (2002) (providing an overview of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(“FTDA”)). 
80 Edgecombe, supra note 79, at 1253–56 (describing these two traditional forms of 
dilution).  The concept of cybersquatting causing dilution was applied in Intermatic Inc. 
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239–41 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
81 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.  Indeed, one of the explicit goals of the 
FTDA was to help fight cybersquatters.  As Senator Leahy of Vermont stated, “it is my 
hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses 
taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and 
reputations of others.” 141 CONG. REC. 38,561 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
82 The statute reads: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against 
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such 
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in 
this subsection. 
15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
83 Professor McCarthy, the trademark scholar, observes that “[t]he relationship between 
domain names and trademark law falls into two parts: validity and infringement.” 
McCarthy, supra note 75, at 241.  The validity question is whether a domain name is, or 
can become, a trade or service mark, and McCarthy confidently answers in the 
affirmative. See id. at 241–42.  As to whether a domain name can infringe someone else’s 
valid trademark or service mark, however, McCarthy finds the issue more complex. See 
id. at 242–43; see also Sharrock, supra note 17, at 840 n.131 (suggesting that TLDs such 
as <.com> or <.net> are not individually capable of serving as trademarks, since they are 
not capable of being source identifiers). 
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domain names in the contemporary world of commerce.  As one 
commentator observed: 
The domain name serves a dual purpose.  It marks the 
location of the site within cyberspace, much like a postal 
address in the real world, but it may also indicate to users 
some information as to the content of the site, and, in 
instances of well-known trade names or trademarks, may 
provide information as to the origin of the contents of the 
site.84 
Courts have recognized that potential customers of well-known 
mark holders will be discouraged if they cannot find that 
company’s mark at its most obvious location, “but instead are 
forced to wade through hundreds of web sites.”85  Addressing the 
problem in Panavision International L.P. v. Toeppen, the Ninth 
Circuit observed that “[a] significant purpose of the domain name 
is to identify the entity that owns the web site.”86  Affirming an 
FTDA ruling against a cybersquatting defendant, the court found 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark in its domain name 
“diminished ‘the capacity of the [plaintiff’s] marks to identify and 
distinguish [its] goods and services on the Internet.’”87 
The second problem was the commercial use requirement.  In 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
mere registration of a domain name is not, in and of itself, a 
“commercial use” for the purposes of dilution.88  In the Panavision 
case, however, the cybersquatter only used the allegedly diluting 
domain name to post on his Web site views of the landscape of 
 
84 Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET-COMMERCE, FREE SPEECH, 
SECURITY, OBSENITY AND ENTERTAINMENT, at 151, 156 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, 
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 471, 1997), quoted in 
Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998). 
85 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1326 (quoting 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (district court 
opinion)).  This kind of dilution developed by the court was sometimes called “dilution 
by elimination.” See Ronald Abramson, Internet Domain Litigation, 1999, in ADVANCED 
SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW, at 7, 20–21 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and 
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 558, 1999). 
88 189 F.3d 868, 879–80 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Pana, Illinois, but the court nevertheless found a commercial use 
because the cybersquatter tried to profit by the resale of the domain 
name to the entity conducting business under it.89  In other words, 
the court concluded that a cybersquatter might be subject to 
injunction under the FTDA even if its only business is to trade 
domain names with the corresponding mark owners for 
commercial gain. 
U.S. courts have stretched trademark law, and especially the 
FTDA, “like a rubber band” to strike down cybersquatters.90  Thus, 
even before the enactment of the ACPA, cybersquatters were, in 
many cases, successfully defeated in courts.  Some problems 
remained unsolved, however, such as cybersquatting activities that 
did not fall within the protection against dilution by blurring or 
tarnishing a famous mark.91  In addition, the FTDA protects only 
famous marks; non-famous marks are left outside of its scope.92  
At that time, it was clear that some troubling questions remained 
unsolved, for example when registrants sought to profit from the 
“non-mark” value of the domain name, such as in the case of 
surnames.93  Finally, the problem of commercial use was not 
entirely solved by the case law.  For example, existing law left a 
gap for sophisticated cybersquatters who did not show any attempt 
to sell the domain name to the mark owners, but also made no 
 
89 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 
1227, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1996)). 
90 McCarthy, supra note 75, at 247. 
91 Even given the judicial activist approach that courts were willing to take against 
cybersquatters, it remained uncertain how much further courts should go while facing 
more and more sophisticated activities. See generally id. at 245–49. 
92 At that time, some commentators expressed the concern that courts will artificially 
extend beyond recognition the concept and interpretation of “famousness” out of their 
desire to help mark owners in their war against cybersquatting. See, e.g., Michael B. 
Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use of “WWW.TRADEMARK.COM”: The 
Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 455, 478–80 (1997).  One commentator suggested that the district court’s 
expansion of the commercial use requirement in Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 
1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996), “went beyond even the most elastic interpretation of the class of 
goods that the mark will have been registered for . . . and the broadest allowance for the 
plausible boundary of the specific (famous) mark.” Endeshaw, supra note 62, at 337. 
93 See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879–81 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(indicating that the Ninth Circuit did not consider as typical cybersquatting the wholesale 
trade in domain names ending in <.net>, offered for sale for their non-trademark value). 
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other commercial use of it.  Given the trouble and expenses 
involving long, expensive, and complex litigation against the 
cybersquatters, some mark owners simply preferred to pay off the 
ransom.94  Professor J. Thomas McCarthy argued that even with 
the FTDA, “there was a poor fit between the actions of the typical 
cybersquatter and the federal trademark law as it existed” before 
the enactment of the ACPA.95 
II. THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
After reviewing the problematic juncture of trademarks and 
domain names, it is evident why change was imperative.96  In late 
1999, intense pressure from the trademark owner community led to 
the creation of two important mechanisms designed to address 
domain name disputes and thwart cybersquatting:97 the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) and the 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).  This part provides 
an overview on these two important developments and notes some 
of the relevant court decisions interpreting them. 
A. The UDRP 
1. The UDRP Mechanism in Brief 
The UDRP98 is incorporated by reference into all ICANN-
controlled registration agreements of generic top-level domains 
 
94 See, Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 
2000) (indicating that the speculative registration of domain names “prevents use of the 
domain name by the mark owners, who not infrequently have been willing to pay 
‘ransom’ in order to get ‘their names’ back” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5–7 
(1999); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4–7 (1999))). 
95 McCarthy, supra note 75, at 245. 
96 Congress decided that legislation was “needed to clarify the rights of trademark 
owners with respect to bad faith, abusive domain name registration practices, to provide 
clear deterrence to prevent bad faith and abusive conduct, and to provide adequate 
remedies for trademark owners in those cases where it does occur.” S. REP. NO. 106-140, 
at 7–8 (1999). 
97 See supra note 70 (defining cybersquatting). 
98 ICANN, UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), at http://www.icann.org-
/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UDRP or POLICY]. 
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such as <.com>, <.net>, and <.org>.99  The UDRP controls the 
rights and obligations of the domain name registrant vis-à-vis the 
registrar in cases of a third party’s claims regarding the 
registration.100  The UDRP is sometimes called a mandatory or 
administrative arbitration mechanism, since it created a 
compulsory tribunal to adjudicate cybersquatting claims.101  What 
makes the UDRP so powerful and unavoidable is that, by virtue of 
an exclusive agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
ICANN is the only entity responsible for the administration of the 
domain name system.102  ICANN’s contracts with the gTLD 
registries compel the incorporation of the UDRP in all contracts 
between these gTLD registries and commercial registrars, who, in 
turn, incorporate the UDRP in all registration agreements with 
gTLD registrants.103  Hence, since 1999 all ICANN-controlled 
gTLD registrants must adhere to the UDRP.104 
 
99 See Froomkin, supra note 69, at 716 (explaining that ICANN requires all registrants 
in gTLDs such as <.com> to agree to a mandatory online dispute resolution process). 
100 The Policy provides: 
This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy . . . has been adopted 
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers . . . is 
incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the 
terms and conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party 
other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain 
name registered by you. 
UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 1. 
101 A more accurate description of the UDRP, however, portrayed it as “a hybrid 
decision-making structure that draws on elements found in arbitration, adjudication, and 
ministerial decision-making systems.” Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 154 (2001). 
102 See Michael Geist, FAIR.COM?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systematic 
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903, 913–21 (2002) (chronicling 
the developments leading to ICANN’s creation and noting that “the U.S. government 
approved the creation of ICANN, granting the new non-profit corporation the 
responsibility for centralizing the management of the DNS”). 
103 See Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A 
Cheaper Way to Hijack Domain Names and Suppress Critics, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
211, 228 (2001) (noting that the UDRP and its accompanying rules are incorporated by 
reference into all registration agreements with approved registrars). 
104 For a timeline of the implementation of the Policy, see ICANN, Timeline for the 
Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003). 
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The UDRP consists of a policy105 as well as rules.106  It was 
crafted to interfere only with blunt and straightforward cases of 
infringing registrations.107  In such a typical case, the registrant, 
having no rights in a mark, takes advantage of the fact that domain 
names are assigned on a first come, first served basis and registers 
an attractive domain name—or often, many domain names—
incorporating an established mark.108  Under the UDRP, a 
complainant must prove three elements: (1) the domain name is 
identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which the complainant 
has rights; (2) the registrant has no legitimate interests in respect of 
the domain name; and (3) the domain name has been registered 
and is being used in bad faith.109  Once these three elements are 
satisfied, the UDRP panel is entitled to order the cancellation of 
the domain name or its transfer to the complainant.110  The UDRP 
also supplies a non-exclusive list of circumstances indicating 
registration and use in bad faith,111 and a non-exclusive list of 
 
105 See supra note 98. 
106 See ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 
(1999), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) 
[hereinafter UDRP RULES]. 
107 See David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Disputes Decisions, 
18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 46 (2001) (noting that the UDRP, at 
least theoretically, is intended to cover only a narrow range of domain name disputes); 
Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 101, at 183–84 (describing the reaffirmation of a 
narrow-in-scope UDRP concept and citing relevant parts of ICANN’s Second Staff 
Report, which significantly shaped the Policy in its final version). 
108 See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
109 See UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(a). 
110 See id. ¶ 3. 
111 See id. ¶ 4(b).  Under the UDRP, the following circumstances, “in particular but 
without limitation,” demonstrate the bad-faith registration and use of a domain name: 
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the 
domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise 
transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner 
of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for 
valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs 
directly related to the domain name; or 
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the 
trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain 
name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or 
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of 
disrupting the business of a competitor; or 
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affirmative defenses showing legitimate interests in the domain 
name.112 
The UDRP has been a very popular tool for mark owners 
seeking recourse against possible cybersquatters.113  One of the 
major reasons for the UDRP’s popularity among mark owners is its 
fast, streamlined, and effective process.114  Since the UDRP draws 
its power from the registration agreement that uniformly 
incorporates this mechanism, it is not limited by geographical 
boundaries.  As noted, the UDRP was explicitly not meant to bind 
a court deciding on the same dispute.  Before, after, and in the 
course of the UDRP process, registrants are entitled to commence 
a legal action in court,115 and the court’s decision, once rendered, is 
 
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for 
commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by 
creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, 
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a 
product or service on your web site or location. 
Id. 
112 See id. ¶ 4(c).  Under the UDRP, the following circumstances, “in particular but 
without limitation,” indicate rights and legitimate interests in a domain name: 
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable 
preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain 
name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or 
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly 
known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service 
mark rights; or 
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain 
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or 
to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue. 
Id. 
113 According to ICANN’s Web site, as of September 10, 2003, more than 8,500 
proceedings were filed to UDRP panels, concerning more than 14,500 domain names. 
See ICANN, Summary of Status of Proceedings, at http://www.icann.org-/udrp/-
proceedings-stat.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2003). 
114 See, e.g., UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 5(a) (registrant must file a response to the 
complaint within 20 days of the “day of commencement”); id. ¶ 6 (a panel is generally 
appointed within five days of the filing of the response); id. ¶ 15(b) (decision should be 
rendered by the panel, absent of exceptional circumstances, within fourteen days of it 
appointment). 
115 See, e.g., BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508–09 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that a plaintiff that has filed an ICANN administrative 
proceeding may bring action in federal court before, during, and after filing the ICANN 
proceeding). 
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decisive with respect to the rights in the domain name.116  
Additionally, if a losing registrant in the UDRP proceeding, whose 
domain name has been ordered cancelled or transferred, files a 
complaint in a court of mutual jurisdiction117 within ten business 
days from the panel’s decision, execution of the panel’s ruling has 
an automatic stay until the court decides on the matter or until the 
dispute is otherwise resolved.118 
2. The Mutual Jurisdiction Problem and Rule 3(b)(xiii) 
At this point, it is important to highlight an often-overlooked 
aspect of the UDRP rules.  Rule 3(b)(xiii) provides that a 
trademark owner wishing to file a complaint against a registrant, 
must, as part of the procedural act of filing the complaint to the 
panel, submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in at least one 
specified “mutual jurisdiction.”119  This provision is relevant in 
those cases where the mark owner wins the UDRP proceeding and 
the registrant subsequently wants to challenge the panel’s decision 
in court.120  Mutual jurisdiction is defined in the rules as: 
[A] court jurisdiction at the location of either (a) the 
principal office of the Registrar . . . or (b) the domain-name 
holder’s address as shown for the registration of the domain 
name in Registrar’s Whois database at the time the 
complaint is submitted to the Provider.121 
Reading this definition, it becomes apparent that the registrant 
has complete control over the determination of which court would 
be a mutual jurisdiction court.122  Obviously, the registrant can 
decide with which registrar to register the domain name and may 
make that choice based on which registrar has its principal office 
 
116 See id.; see also UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k). 
117 See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the concept of mutual jurisdiction). 
118 See UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k). 
119 See UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 3(b)(xiii). 
120 See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 101, at 186 (describing the process of 
approving the concept of mutual jurisdiction in the final version of the UDRP). 
121 See UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 1; see also infra note 124 (defining a “Whois” 
directory). “Registrar” is defined in the rules as “the entity with which the Respondent 
[i.e., registrant] has registered a domain name that is the subject of a complaint.” UDRP 
RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 1. 
122 See Efroni, supra note 24, at 350 n.101. 
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in a preferred jurisdiction.123  In addition, the registrant clearly 
decides which address to provide to the registrar, an address that 
ultimately appears in the registrar’s Whois database.124  
Furthermore, a sophisticated registrant could merge the two 
options of mutual jurisdiction into one.125  This aspect of the 
UDRP is important in cases when personal jurisdiction over the 
(potential) mark owner is questionable in a particular court, but the 
cybersquatter wants, nevertheless, to secure litigation in that 
favored jurisdiction.126 
B. The ACPA 
The second mechanism controlling cybersquatting disputes is 
the ACPA.127  Congress was convinced that the uncertainty as to 
the application of trademark law, inconsistent judicial decisions, 
and the growing phenomenon of cybersquatting needed to be 
remedied.128  The result was the ACPA, a statute enacted in 
1999129 and incorporated into the Lanham Act.  The ACPA 
includes two types of actions affording mark owners recourse in 
cybersquatting cases: in personam actions130 and in rem actions.131  
 
123 Today, there are more than 170 registrars worldwide accredited by ICANN to sell 
domain names to consumers. See ICANN, ICANN-Accredited Registrars, at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2003). 
124 A “Whois” directory is the list of registrants and their details run by the registration 
authority. See Cable News Networks v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 n.14 
(E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter CNN II], vacated in part on other grounds by CNN Appeal, 
No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846; see also Network Solutions, Whois Search, at 
http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/whois/index.jhtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2003). 
125 For example, a hypothetical registrant may wish to register a <.com> domain name 
and also make sure that in case he or she loses in the UDRP, any subsequent litigation 
regarding this registration shall take place in the state of Virginia.  All that the registrant 
needs to do is to choose a Virginia-based registrar and supply to that registrar a Virginia 
address to appear in the Whois database. 
126 See discussion infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing possible litigation strategies of 
registrants). 
127 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125, 1129 (2000). 
128 See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495–96 (2d Cir. 
2000) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999) and S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999)). 
129 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of the Intellectual Property and 
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 
(1999). 
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). 
131 See id. § 1125(d)(2). 
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Another important section is the reverse domain name hijacking 
(“RDNH”) provision, designed to grant protection to registrants 
against unjustified cybersquatting claims.132 
1. In Personam Action 
In an in personam action under the ACPA, the mark owner 
must first be able to establish in personam jurisdiction over the 
registrant.133  The ACPA test for unlawful cybersquatting is three-
prong.  Registration of a domain name violates the ACPA if: (i) 
there is a protected mark involved, (ii) which, without regard to 
goods and services, a corresponding domain name was registered, 
trafficked or used, (iii) with a bad faith intent to profit from that 
activity.134  One of the most important innovations of the ACPA is 
the substitution of the traditional use in commerce and likelihood 
of confusion or dilution elements with the “identical or confusingly 
similar” and “bad faith intent to profit” principles.135  Courts 
generally reduce ACPA in personam analysis to three elementary 
questions: (1) whether the mark in question is distinctive or famous 
and therefore entitlement to protection under U.S. trademark 
law;136 (2) whether the domain name is identical or confusingly 
similar to the mark;137 and (3) whether there was a bad faith intent 
to profit on the part of the registrant.138  Upon such finding, 
liability under the ACPA is generally imposed and the mark owner 
may win effective and powerful relief against the registrant, 
including forfeiture, cancellation, and transfer of the mark.139  The 
ACPA also allows mark owners to seek statutory damages up to 
 
132 See id. § 1114(2)(D)(v). 
133 See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (describing U.S. personal jurisdiction principles). 
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 
135 See id.  Liability is imposed when “bad faith intent to profit” is established in 
registering, trafficking, or using a domain name that is identical with or confusingly 
similar to a distinctive mark, or identical, or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a 
famous mark. See id.  The provision makes no mention of a requirement of “use in 
commerce” or a “likelihood of confusion.” See id. 
136 See id. § 1125(a) (infringement); id. § 1125(c) (dilution). 
137 In the case of famous marks, the ACPA also protects against registrations that are 
dilutive of the mark, so long as the mark was famous at the time of the domain name’s 
registration. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II). 
138 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001). 
139 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C). 
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$100,000 per infringing domain name,140 along with other Lanham 
Act remedies such as actual damages and attorneys’ fees.141 
2. In Rem Action 
The drafters of the ACPA added the in rem provision to the 
new legislation, acknowledging that the speculative nature of 
cybersquatting activities may sometimes leave mark owners 
without an adequate in personam remedy.142  In order to apply in 
rem jurisdiction principles in domain name disputes, courts 
generally followed the legislative determination that domain names 
were property, or res, entitled to in rem jurisdiction,143 with a 
“physical” location where the registration authorities are located.144  
 
140 See id. § 1117(d). 
141 See id. § 1117(a). 
142 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 113–14 (1999) (explaining that the in rem 
provision is designed to lessen the difficulty faced by trademark owners when 
cybersquatters “register domain names under aliases or otherwise provide false 
information in their registration applications in order to avoid identification and service 
of process by the mark owner”); see also Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 
298 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the in rem provision “was provided in part to address the 
situation in which “‘a non-U.S. resident cybersquats on a domain name that infringes 
upon a U.S. trademark’” (quoting 145 CONG. REC. H10823, H10826 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 
1999))). 
143 See Mattel, 310 F.3d at 300 n.7 (noting that “Congress clearly intended to treat 
domain names as property for purposes of the ACPA’s in rem provisions” (citing 145 
CONG. REC. H10826 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1999))); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., v. 
Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Congress may treat a domain name 
registration as property subject to in rem jurisdiction if it chooses, without violating the 
Constitution.”); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 
(E.D. Va. 2000) (“There is no prohibition on a legislative body making something 
property.  Even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data property 
and assign its place of registration as its situs.”). 
144 See Mattel, 310 F.3d at 301.  The court stated: 
[B]oth the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that in rem 
jurisdiction is a preexisting fact determined by the location of the disputed 
domain name’s registrar or a similar authority, and that the subsequent deposit 
of sufficient documents with a court of appropriate jurisdiction confirms the 
domain name’s legal situs as being in that judicial district for purposes of the 
litigation. 
Id.  The court further found that the law’s legislative history “makes it clear that Congress 
considered the ‘registry or registrar’ to provide a ‘nexus’ for in rem jurisdiction under the 
ACPA.” Id. at 302 (quotation marks altered) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 
(1999)); see also Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 
121, 126 (D. Mass. 2001) (concluding that “the language of the ACPA restricts in rem 
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The language of the ACPA allows an in rem action when an in 
personam action is not feasible,145 or when the registrant cannot be 
found through due diligence.146  When the prerequisites for an in 
rem action are satisfied, “[t]he owner of a mark may file an in rem 
civil action against a domain name in the judicial district in which 
the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain 
name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is 
located.”147  Remedies, however, under the in rem provision are 
limited to “a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the 
domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of 
the mark.”148 
The in rem provision has recently been subject to intensive 
litigation.  U.S. federal courts interpreting the in rem provision 
have reached several significant holdings: 
• The proper judicial situs for filing an in rem action is the 
district in which the domain name registration authority 
resides, as opposed to any other U.S. jurisdiction.149 
• When both the registrant and registrar are foreign but the 
domain name registry is located in the United States, an in 
rem action in the district where the registry resides 
satisfies constitutional due process and the establishment 
of minimum contacts with that jurisdiction is not 
required.150 
 
jurisdiction to the judicial district in which the registrar, registry, or other domain name 
authority is located”). 
145 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2000); see also Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane 
S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.Com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344–45 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding that 
the ACPA in personam and in rem provisions are mutually exclusive). 
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
147 See id. § 1125(d)(2)(A). 
148 See id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i). 
149 See Fleetboston, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (concluding that allowing an aggrieved 
plaintiff to sue in the state of his or her choosing “would permit a procedure that plainly 
offends traditional notions of fair play and justice”). 
150 See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 259–260 (4th Cir. 
2002) (holding that in a case that directly concerns possession of the defendant domain 
names, the registrant’s other personal contacts with the forum are constitutionally 
irrelevant to the assertion of in rem jurisdiction over those domain names); see also CNN 
I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“[I]n an ACPA in rem action, it is not 
necessary that the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum contacts with the forum; 
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• In order to succeed in an in rem action, proving 
registrant’s bad faith is not required.151 
• A federal injunction against a registry located in the 
United States is the proper means to enforce the federal 
court’s decision to disable or cancel domain name 
registration,152 as well as transfer the registration to 
plaintiff.153 
3. The Reverse Domain Name Highjacking Provision 
As previously noted,154 the RDNH provision aims to protect 
registrants against unjustified cybersquatting claims.  The 
provision states that a domain name registrant whose domain name 
has been suspended, disabled, or transferred under a reasonable 
policy may, upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to 
establish that the registration or use of the domain name by such 
registrant is not unlawful.155  A court can then grant injunctive 
relief to the registrant, including the reactivation of the domain 
name or transfer of the domain name to the original registrant.156 
 
it is enough, as here, that the registry is located in the forum; it is enough, as here, that the 
registry is located in the forum.”). 
151 See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 227–32 (4th Cir. 
2002). 
152 See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (“[A] court is not limited merely to the disabling procedure envisioned by [the 
registry’s] contractual agreements, but may also order the registry to delete completely a 
domain name registration pursuant to the court’s order.”). 
153 See Am. Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453–54 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
154 See supra text accompanying note 132.  The Fourth Circuit’s Barcelona.com opinion 
ably explained the term “reverse domain name highjacking.”  The court explained: 
If a domain-name registrant cybersquats in violation of the ACPA, he “hijacks” 
the domain name from a trademark owner who ordinarily would be expected to 
have the right to use the domain name involving his trademark.  But when a 
trademark owner overreaches in exercising rights under the ACPA, he “reverse 
hijacks” the domain name from the domain-name registrant.  Thus,  
§ 1114(2)(D)(v), enacted to protect domain-name registrants against 
overreaching trademark owners, may be referred to as the “reverse domain 
name hijacking” provision. 
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 625 n.1 
(4th Cir. 2003). 
155 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v). 
156 Id. 
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The provision is well illustrated by the First Circuit’s opinion 
in Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA.157  David Sallen, a 
U.S. resident,158 registered the domain name 
<www.corinthians.com> with Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”).159  
The famous Brazilian soccer team, Corinthiao (Portuguese for 
“Corinthians”), which had, inter alia, Brazilian trademark rights in 
the mark CORINTHIAO, filed and won a complaint under the 
UDRP.160  Within the required ten days, Sallen filed a federal 
lawsuit in the United States,161 seeking a declaratory judgment that 
his registration for the domain name did not violate the ACPA.162 
At some point, apparently for the purpose of intercepting the 
motion for declaratory judgment, the defendant soccer team 
disclaimed any intention to bring further ACPA claims against 
Sallen.163  The defendant moved to dismiss Sallen’s complaint, 
arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,164 
because Sallen requested a declaration of his rights under the 
ACPA and defendant had no intent to sue Sallen under the act.165  
Accepting defendant’s argument, the district court ruled that there 
was no real controversy between the parties and thus, a declaratory 
judgment could not be obtained for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.166  This interpretation suggests that under certain 
 
157 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001). 
158 Id. at 16. 
159 Id. at 20.  At the time of registration in August 1998, Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”) 
was the only registry and registrar for domain names listed in the <.com> gTLD file. See 
Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 
617 (4th Cir. 2003). 
160 See Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. David Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2000-
0461 (July 17, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions-
/html/2000/d2000-0461.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). 
161 See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 00-CV-11555, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19976 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000). 
162 See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22. 
163 See Sallen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976, at *1. 
164 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).   
165 See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 22.  Interestingly, there is no indication in the Sallen district 
court’s opinion that defendants moved to dismiss also for a lack of personal jurisdiction, 
and thus, this matter was not discussed. See Sallen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976. 
166 The district court stated: 
Based on the representations made by Defendant . . . that it “has no intent to 
sue Plaintiff under the ACPA for his past activities in connection with 
corinthians.com” the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED . . . Jurisdiction under 
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circumstances, the UDRP decisions are indeed binding in the 
United States, despite the explicit intention of the policy’s drafters 
and the language of the policy itself.167 
As a result of the district court’s decision the domain name was 
transferred, and Sallen appealed to the First Circuit.168  The 
appellate court reversed the district court’s decision, holding that 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) granted domain registrants who have 
lost domain names under UDRP administrative panel decisions an 
affirmative cause of action in federal court for a declaration of 
nonviolation of the ACPA and for the return of the wrongfully 
transferred domain names.169  The court concluded: 
Although [defendant] has stated that it has no intent to sue 
Sallen under the ACPA for his past actions related to 
corinthians.com, there is indeed a controversy between 
Sallen and [Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA (“CL”)]: 
Sallen asserts that he has rights to corinthians.com and CL 
asserts that it has mutually exclusive rights to the same 
domain name.  Since the dismissal of Sallen’s complaint, 
the corinthians.com domain name has been transferred to 
CL and is now being used to promote the Corinthians 
soccer team.  Sallen asserts that the domain name belongs 
to him.170 
The court’s decision rejected the defendants’ argument that 
there was no case or controversy.171  Interestingly, at the time 
when the appellate decision was rendered, the motion for 
declaratory judgment was no longer appropriate since the domain 
name was no longer in Sallen’s possession.  The appellate court, 
however, offered a potential solution for future litigation, 
suggesting in a footnote that if Sallen had been given the 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2201 [authorizing declaratory judgments] is proper only if there 
exists an actual controversey [sic] between the parties.  Absent the threat of suit 
there is no controversy and jurisdiction is lacking. 
Sallen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19976, at *1–*2 (citation omitted). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 115–118. 
168 Sallen, 273 F.3d at 25. 
169 See id. at 24–30. 
170 Id. at 25. 
171 See id. at 25–30. 
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opportunity to amend his complaint, then he could have properly 
sought an injunction.172  This determination was the first indication 
from an appellate court that injunctions and declaratory relief 
under the RDNH provision are appropriate remedies for registrants 
seeking reversal of UDRP decisions. 
Part of the controversy in Sallen involved language in the 
RDNH provision requiring notice to be given to the “mark owner” 
upon the filing of an action to establish that the use of a mark is not 
unlawful.173  The defendant argued that the term “mark owner” in 
that statute refers only to registered U.S. trademarks.174  
Accordingly, the defendant argued that registrant protection under 
the RDNH provision cannot apply to its mark, which was 
registered in Brazil but not in the United States.175  The Sallen 
court rejected this argument based on legal analysis of the 
language and definitions of the law.176  In addition, the court 
provided a policy argument for broad reading of the provision: 
[I]nterpreting “mark owner” to apply only to registered 
U.S. marks would create a perverse result at odds with our 
view of the ACPA as granting relief to registrants who have 
wrongly lost domain names in UDRP proceedings.  It 
would be very odd if Congress, which was well aware of 
the international nature of trademark disputes, protected 
Americans against reverse domain name hijacking only 
when a registered American mark owner was doing the 
hijacking.  Such a policy would permit American citizens, 
 
172 See id. at 16 n.1.  The court stated: 
Sallen’s initiation of these proceedings in the district court stayed the WIPO 
panel’s order to transfer the domain name to [the defendant].  After the district 
court dismissed Sallen’s suit, however, the domain name was transferred to 
[Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA], possibly wrongfully in light of a pending 
appeal. If the complaint were reinstated, the logic of Sallen’s position is that he 
would seek leave to amend his complaint to request an injunction returning the 
domain name. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
173 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (A losing registrant “may, upon notice to the mark 
owner, file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by 
such registrant is not unlawful under this chapter.”). 
174 Sallen, 273 F.3d at 24. 
175 Id. at 24 & n.10. 
176 Id. at 23–24. 
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whose domain names are subject to WIPO transfer orders, 
to get relief against abusive mark owners that have 
registered in the U.S., but not against abusive mark owners 
that have not registered (including both foreign mark 
owners and domestic mark owners that have not 
registered).  It would leave registrants unprotected against 
reverse domain name hijackers so long as the hijackers are 
not registered with the PTO.177 
The court was obviously concerned that a narrow reading of 
the provision could yield absurd results, with registrants having no 
recourse against unregistered- or foreign-mark owners who have 
prevailed in a UDRP proceeding.178  Another related jurisdictional 
question—one left unresolved even after Sallen—is whether an 
RDNH action requires establishment of in personam jurisdiction.  
This issue was not discussed in either the district court opinion or 
circuit court opinion in Sallen, and there is no indication in either 
opinion that the defendant, a foreign soccer team asserting a 
foreign trademark, introduced an in personam jurisdiction 
objection.179  Because personal jurisdiction was not directly 
discussed in Sallen, the opinion leaves open an interesting 
question: could the U.S. registrant use in rem principles as an 
alternative jurisdictional basis for his or her RDNH claim? 
As noted above, the ACPA in rem provision is not helpful 
when the mark is not protected in the United States.180  In addition, 
the provision is available only to “the owner of a mark,” as 
distinguished from a domain name registrant.181  Lastly, the RDNH 
provision does not specifically provide for in rem jurisdiction.  
Thus, a court might conclude that absent personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, the RDNH action should be dismissed. 
The above quoted language from Sallen, however, provides a 
rationale for a different analysis leading to the opposite result.  The 
Sallen court gave an expansive interpretation to the term “mark 
 
177 Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
178 Id. at 23–24. 
179 See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 00-CV-11555, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19976, at *1–*2 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000); Sallen, 273 F.3d at 20–30. 
180 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (protecting only Lanham Act marks). 
181 See id. 
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owner” appearing in the RDNH provision.  As explained by the 
court, the reason was to protect U.S. registrants, such as Sallen, 
against reverse-domain-name-hijacking commenced by foreign 
owners.182  Further requirement of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant could easily frustrate the purpose of Sallen’s mark 
owner interpretation.183 
The comparison of Sallen’s mark owner interpretation to the 
rationale behind the legislation of the in rem provision is 
inevitable.  It should not be hard to demonstrate how U.S. plaintiff-
registrants might face difficult procedural setbacks in 
circumstances where foreign defendant-owners’ activity does not 
meet personal jurisdiction tests.  Despite the fact that a winning 
UDRP mark owner may prevent a U.S. registrant from using a 
domain name worldwide and also in the United States—that is, 
over the Internet—the registrant would not be able to sue under the 
ACPA without establishing personal jurisdiction.  This was exactly 
the problem that American mark owners faced while attempting to 
challenge foreign registrants under pre-ACPA American law, and 
this was exactly the reason why the in rem provision was 
legislated.184 
Put differently, Sallen’s “mark owner” interpretation coupled 
with ACPA in rem rationale may enable a court to read the in rem 
jurisdiction authority into the RDNH provision.185  Although this is 
 
182 Sallen, 273 F.3d at 24. 
183 In order to illustrate this point, assume that the defendant in the Sallen case had 
succeeded in a hypothetical personal jurisdiction objection.  In such case, no matter how 
broad the term “mark owner” is interpreted, the court probably would have had to dismiss 
the suit due to lack of jurisdictional basis. 
184 See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (providing background to the legislation of the in 
rem provision). 
185 A pre-ACPA case suggested that the district court did not have jurisdiction in a suit 
filed against the domain names themselves absent specific authority provided in the 
relevant statutory language (in that case, by the FTDA) giving the court subject-matter 
jurisdiction. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d. 707, 711–13 
(E.D. Va. 1999), vacated due to a superseding statute by Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. 
Allporsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000) (table), and remanded in part by Porsche 
Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).  The court applied rule 
4(n) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the FTDA and found that such in rem 
jurisdiction could not be exercised. Id. at 711–12.  Without conducting a detailed 
comparison between the Porsche decision and a hypothetical application of in rem 
jurisdiction in a reverse domain name hijacking (“RDNH”) case, at least one commentary 
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purely a theoretical solution to a theoretical problem, it may draw 
attention to the fact that by using existing legal tools, U.S. courts 
might further extend the application of the ACPA also against 
foreign owners without the need to meet the burden of personal 
jurisdiction and perhaps, where such owner has no minimum 
contacts with the United States.186 
Despite this area of uncertainty, the Sallen decision represents 
an important moment in U.S. domain name disputes jurisprudence.  
It provides that a losing registrant may bring a RDNH action 
against the mark owner and obtain relief before and after the 
implementation of the UDRP.  Further, the opinion illustrates a 
crucial point: under the ACPA, registrants should be able to attack 
UDRP decisions in disputes involving any kind of marks, U.S. and 
foreign.  As will be discussed further, this aspect of Sallen bears 
important consequences for international domain name disputes 
litigated in the United States. 
III. THE BARCELONA.COM DISPUTE 
After this long but necessary background, this Article turns its 
focus to the Fourth Circuit’s June 2003 opinion in the case of 
Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de 
Barcelona,187 which unanimously reversed, vacated, and remanded 
the lower court’s decision, rendered by Chief Judge Claude M. 
Hilton of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.188  
 
has suggested that application of in rem jurisdiction does not require specific authority in 
the law. See Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 
117 (2000).  Professor Lee stated: 
The Porsche Cars court’s analysis misconstrues the very nature of in rem 
jurisdiction. A proceeding in rem is not an anomalous action requiring special 
statutory authorization to overcome some sort of disfavored status. Rather, the 
designation “in rem” is one of two longstanding bases on which a court 
traditionally has acquired territorial jurisdiction over a dispute. 
Id. 
186 As described infra Part IV.D.1, it appears that U.S. courts do not require the 
establishment of minimum contacts over foreign registrants in ACPA in rem provision 
actions. 
187 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003). 
188 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 
367 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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Section A of this part describes the factual background of the 
dispute over the domain name <www.barcelona.com> between a 
Spanish couple and the City Council of Barcelona, Spain. 
Subsection B describes the Fourth Circuit’s decision on appeal. 
A. The Facts189 
In February 1996, Joan Nogueras Cobo (“Nogueras”), a 
Spanish citizen, registered the domain name 
<www.barcelona.com> in the name of his wife with the U.S. 
registrar, NSI.190  On the Web site, the couple provided tourist 
information about Barcelona, e-mail services, a chat room, and 
links to other Web sites.191  In early 1999, the Nogueras e-mailed 
the mayor of Barcelona (“Mayor”) through a Web form on the 
official Web site of the City Council of Barcelona (“City 
Council”), proposing to negotiate with the City Council for its 
acquisition of the Web site, but Nogueras received no response.192 
Later that year, Nogueras and a business partner formed 
Barcelona.com, Inc. under Delaware law to own and run the Web 
site.193  Although the Barcelona.com, Inc. maintains a New York 
mailing address, it has no employees in the United States, does not 
own or lease office space in the country, and does not have a phone 
listing in the United States.194  Furthermore, its computer server is 
in Spain.195 
In March 2000, the City Council contacted Nogueras to learn 
more about the corporation and its plans for the domain name.  
Nogueras and his marketing director met with City Council 
representatives and later sent them a business plan for the Web 
site.196  The negotiations did not ripen into an agreement, however, 
 
189 In describing the background of the dispute, the relies on the facts as described in 
both the district court and circuit court decisions. 
190 Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
191 Id. 
192 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 620. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.  Soon after the city council made its demand, Norgueras had the domain name 
transferred from his wife’s name to the corporation, which he had neglected to do in 1999 
when the corporation was formed. Id. at 620–21. 
EFRONI FORMAT 12/9/2003  2:31 PM 
2003] BETTER MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN DISPUTES 65 
and in May 2000 the City Council demanded the transfer of the 
domain name to its possession.197 
After Barcelona.com, Inc. refused to surrender the domain 
name, the City Council, which owned numerous trademark 
registrations in Spain incorporating the word Barcelona,198 
launched a UDRP proceeding against the registrants claiming that 
the registration of the domain name violated the UDRP.199  The 
City Council won the UDRP proceeding, with a panelist200 from 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) concluding, 
inter alia, (1) that the city had trademark rights in the term 
Barcelona under Spanish law, and (2) that the domain name was 
registered and used in bad faith.201  Thus, the registration was held 
to violate the UDRP.202  Consequently, the domain name was 
ordered transferred to the City Council, in accord with the UDRP 
authority.203  Before the execution of the transfer order, 
Barcelona.com, Inc. commenced a lawsuit in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking declaratory judgment and 
asserting, inter alia, that the registration of the domain name was 
not unlawful.204  Consequently, and in accordance with the UDRP 
rules, the transfer was automatically halted until a further ruling by 
the district court.205 
The district court’s decision validated the transfer, concluding 
that under Spanish law the City Council was probably the rightful 
owner of all marks incorporating the term Barcelona.206  
Furthermore, the district court concluded that the registrants 
demonstrated “bad faith intent to profit” and therefore, the 
 
197 Id. at 621. 
198 Id. 
199 See Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com, Inc., WIPO Case 
No. D2000-0505 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/-
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0505.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). 
200 In this instance, a single WIPO panelist, Marino Porzio, rendered the UDRP 
decision. Id. 
201 Id. ¶ 5. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. ¶ 6. 
204 Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
205 See UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k). 
206 Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 372. 
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registration could not be declared “not unlawful.”207  The district 
court also discussed the City Council cybersquatting counterclaims 
and found that the ACPA also protected foreign marks against 
cybersquatting.208  Since the City Council demonstrated that it had 
valid rights under the law of Spain, and since the domain name 
was identical or confusingly similar to the marks owned by the 
city, the prayer for a declaratory judgment in favor of the 
registrants was denied.209 
B. The Forth Circuit Ruling 
The Fourth Circuit in a unanimous opinion reversed, vacated, 
and remanded the lower court’s decision to validate the transfer of 
the mark to the City Council.210  The Forth Circuit’s analysis, as 
laid out in its opinion, has four key aspects: (1) jurisdictional 
issues; (2) applicability of foreign law; (3) elements of the RDNH 
provision; and (4) the protection extended under U.S. law to the 
Barcelona mark.211 
1. Jurisdictional Issues 
First, the court determined that under the ACPA’s RDNH 
provision,212 it had subject matter jurisdiction,213 in accord with the 
First Circuit’s decision in the case of Sallen v. Corinthians 
Licenciamentos LTDA.214  As noted earlier in this Article, the 
RDNH provision confers a specific cause of action and relevant 
remedies in a federal court to a registrant losing in a UDRP 
proceeding and seeking to reverse the panel’s decision and retain 
his or her domain name registration.215  The provision, in essence, 
gives the losing registrant a second chance to prove in federal court 
 
207 Id. at 372–73. 
208 Id. at 373–76. See also infra note 262 (discussing these “counterclaims” that 
apparently were never filed). 
209 See id. at 376–77. 
210 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th 
Cir. 2003). 
211 See id. 
212 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000). 
213 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623. 
214 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001). 
215 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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that the registration is not unlawful under the Lanham Act.  
Tracing back to the policy behind the ACPA and the objectives of 
Congress in enacting it, the court concluded that “because the 
UDRP is susceptible of being grounded on principles foreign or 
hostile to American law, the ACPA authorizes reversing a panel 
decision if such a result is called for by application of the Lanham 
Act.”216 
The general rule allowing the registrant’s cause of action was 
already determined in Sallen.217  In this case, Barcelona.com, Inc. 
was a domain name registrant that lost its registration in a UDRP 
proceeding, and hence, the ACPA gave the court subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute.218  The City Council argued that upon 
filing the complaint to the UDRP panel it agreed to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of “‘the Courts of Virginia (United States), only 
with respect to any challenge that may be made by [Nogueras] to a 
decision by the Administrative Panel to transfer or cancel the 
domain name that are subject to this complaint.’”219  In line with 
this argument, the City Council, as understood by the court, agreed 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the federal court in a suit under the 
RDNH provision.  According to the City Council’s theory, 
however, the federal court was limited to the law applied in the 
panel’s decision—in this case, Spanish trademark law.220  Put 
differently, the City Council partially objected to the jurisdiction of 
the federal court, at least with respect to the potential application of 
U.S. law. 
The court, rejecting this contention, reiterated that the UDRP 
proceeding is not jurisdictional in nature.221  At the end of part II of 
 
216 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 626. 
217 See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 28 (explaining that “a federal court’s interpretation of the 
ACPA supplants a WIPO panel’s interpretation of the UDRP”), noted in Barcelona.com, 
330 F.3d at 626. 
218 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623. 
219 Id. at 621 (citing the City Council’s complaint). 
220 Id. at 623.  It is not exactly clear from the language of the decision whether the city 
council tried to make a personal jurisdiction objection or subject matter objection.  On the 
one hand, an assertion that the court’s review is limited to application of a certain law 
more resembles a subject matter challenge.  When a party agrees to litigate in a certain 
jurisdiction or limits such an agreement to a certain jurisdiction, however, such an 
agreement is enforceable and relevant only to questions of personal jurisdiction. 
221 Id. at 623. 
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the decision, the court concluded that the only possible 
significance of a previous UDRP process in this context was that it 
triggered the RDNH provision.222  Furthermore, the court 
concluded that it was not limited in any way by the WIPO 
proceeding and the law applied there.223  In sum, the federal court 
had jurisdiction over the City Council and over the dispute, and the 
UDRP decision, including the law applied under the procedure, 
had no bearing on the federal court’s jurisdictional reach and legal 
analysis. 
2. Foreign Law Not Applicable 
In the second part of the analysis, the court gave no deference 
to Spanish law and determined that the district court erred in 
analyzing the parties’ rights under a foreign legal system.224  The 
RDNH provision provides a cause of action to the losing registrant 
and allows a plaintiff to show in federal court that the registration 
is “not unlawful under this chapter.”225  The chapter being referred 
to is chapter 22 of title 15 of the U.S. Code, which contains the 
Lanham Act; and foreign law was not applicable.226 
3. The Elements of the RDNH Provision 
Third, the court enumerated the elements of the section 
1114(2)(D)(v) cause of action, finding each to be present in this 
case.  Under the statute, plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is the 
domain name registrant; (2) his or her domain name was 
suspended, disabled or transferred under a policy implemented by 
the registrar (here, the UDRP); (3) that the owner of the mark had a 
notice of the action in federal court and; (4) that plaintiff’s 
 
222 Id. at 625. 
223 See id. at 626. 
224 Id. at 627. 
225 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 627 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000)).  The 
Barcelona.com court noted that the original language of ACPA provides that the 
registrant may sue to declare that the domain name’s use by such registrant is “not 
unlawful under this Act,” with “Act” defined to refer to the Trademark Act of 1946 (the 
Lanham Act). Id. at 627 n.2 (citing 113 Stat. 1501A-550, § 3004 (1999)).  But upon 
codification, the term “this Act” became “this chapter,” i.e., chapter 22 of title 15, which 
contains the Lanham Act. Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 627 n.2. 
226 See Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 627 & n.2. 
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registration or use of the domain name is not unlawful under the 
Lanham Act, as amended.227  Since the first three elements of the 
test were undisputed and since the City Council did not even 
attempt to prove trademark rights in the term Barcelona under U.S. 
law, the court determined that Barcelona.com, Inc. was entitled to 
the protection of the RDNH provision.228 
4. BARCELONA Is Not a Protected Mark in the United 
States 
Fourth and last, the court explained that even had the City 
Council tried to defend its trademark rights in the term Barcelona 
under U.S. law, it would have been of no avail.  Because the 
Lanham Act did not protect purely descriptive-geographical 
designations,229 and because the City Council could show no 
evidence that the name Barcelona acquired any secondary meaning 
other than the city itself, the term was not protected under U.S. 
law.230 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT STATE  
OF THE LAW 
This part, divided into five sections, further analyzes the 
court’s opinion and explores its possible consequences.  Section A 
explains why the Barcelona.com court probably rendered a correct 
application of ACPA under the circumstances.  Section B discusses 
and criticizes the opinion’s territoriality justification for the result. 
Subsection C reviews some emerging litigation strategies and the 
development of a “partial reverse effect” pushing owners of 
foreign marks away from UDRP and back to litigation in foreign 
courts.  Section D describes the outcome of Barcelona.com in the 
 
227 Id. at 626. 
228 Id. at 626–29. 
229 Id. at 628–29 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (2000)). 
230 Id. at 629.  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit in Barcelona.com briefly addressed the 
district court’s discussion of the city’s counterclaims of an ACPA violation by the 
plaintiff-registrant.  The circuit court found that the city had never filed a counterclaim 
and thus vacated the rulings that arose from the “phantom counterclaim.” Id at 629; see 
also infra note 262. 
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context of other court decisions, attempting to convey the larger 
context of contemporary cybersquatting jurisprudence in the 
United States.  This section classifies recent ACPA case law into 
three categories having particular relevance in international 
disputes.  It further highlights the “laundry machine effect” and its 
paradox, a troublesome aspect of current ACPA interpretation.  
Finally, Section E discusses the implications of current 
cybersquatting jurisprudence for owners of foreign marks and 
some possible foreign reactions to that legal landscape. 
A. Correct Application of the Law 
The two major innovations of the Barcelona.com case in the 
field of domain name disputes are probably the following: (1) the 
Barcelona.com court was the first appellate court to state and 
clarify the elements of the RDNH cause of action; and (2) it 
concluded that courts should look only to U.S. law to determine 
whether a registration is lawful. 
It seems that the Barcelona.com court’s legal analysis is 
technically correct.  With respect to the principal controversy 
between the parties, the language of ACPA is clear and 
straightforward.  The RDNH provision231 explicitly provides the 
law under which registration should be scrutinized in a RDNH 
situation—”the registration or use . . . is not unlawful under this 
chapter.”232  Additionally, ACPA was mainly crafted by the U.S. 
Congress to protect U.S. marks in U.S. federal courts.233  
Therefore, the RDNH provision applies the U.S standard for 
unlawful cybersquatting.234  A conclusion that the provision 
mandates analysis under foreign system would give U.S. courts 
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate marks recognized by every 
 
231 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (2000). 
232 Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 225. 
233 Senator Spence Abraham of Michigan, one of the Congressional sponsors of the 
ACPA, stated, “This legislation will combat a new form of high tech fraud that is causing 
confusion and inconvenience for consumers . . . and posing an enormous threat to a 
century of pre-Internet American business efforts.” 145 CONG. REC. S7334 (daily ed. 
June 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (emphasis added). 
234 An example of an alternative standard could be found in UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 
4(a). See also discussion supra Part II.A.1 (describing the UDRP cybersquatting 
standard). 
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possible trademark regime of any country.235  In other words, such 
a reading would effectively render ACPA a kind of conduit, 
bringing validity questions of all world marks under the scrutiny of 
U.S. courts—a result that would be at odds with common sense.236 
B. The Territoriality Argument 
It is interesting to observe the emphasis the court put on 
territoriality in trademark law.  In part III of the Barcelona.com 
decision, which reinforced the Fourth Circuit’s opinion about the 
exclusive application of U.S. law, the court noted237 that both the 
United States and Spain have been longtime members of the Paris 
Convention of 1883.238  The Paris Convention recognizes the 
independence of trademark rights among its member states.239  
Furthermore, the Paris Convention does not grant greater 
protection in the United States to foreign marks than what is 
already secured under the Lanham Act.240 
This is probably an accurate statement of the law, although 
slightly flawed.  The problem derives from the attempt to justify a 
certain reading of the ACPA using traditional territoriality 
principles.  As noted earlier, U.S. trademark law aims to prevent 
confusion and unlawful commercial competition practices.  In 
 
235 Interestingly, the ACPA uses different language regarding the trademarks falling 
under its various provisions.  The ACPA in rem provision specifically limits its 
applicability to registered U.S. marks and those marks protected under Lanham Act 
dilution and infringement provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i).  The language of 
the in personam provision plainly protects “a mark.” See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).  Similarly, 
it appears that the language of the RDNH provision refers to a “mark owner” (against 
whom this provision can be exercised) without further specifications. See also infra note 
262 and accompanying text. 
236 See discussion infra Part IV.D.4 (arguing that the Barcelona.com court reached the 
only reasonable result under the circumstances). 
237 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628. 
238 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as 
amended at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
239 Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention secures the territorial independence of marks, 
thus allowing every member-state discretion whether to grant protection within its 
territory to foreign marks protected in other member states. See Paris Convention, supra 
note 238, art. 6(3), noted in Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628. 
240 See Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628 (citing Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic 
Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1992); Int’l Cafe, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe 
Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
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many cases, trademark protection, while securing private 
monopolies that grant exclusive use of certain marks by certain 
commercial players, may be justified only if applied within a 
certain territory where those commercial practices are potentially 
harmful.  For example, when courts and commentators talk about 
likelihood of confusion it is clear that such confusion may occur 
only where consumers recognize the mark as a source identifier.241  
In other words, in order to be protected in a particular jurisdiction, 
a mark must meet that jurisdiction’s legal tests for protection.  In 
some jurisdictions, this means executing the formalities of 
registration.  Meanwhile, in the U.S. federal system the crux is the 
use in U.S. commerce requirement.242 
Hence, trademark law can be described as territorial.  The 
digital-commercial reality introduced new challenges to this 
territoriality concept; thus, the ACPA was enacted to address these 
challenges.243  One of the act’s responses to those challenges was 
the relinquishment of the likelihood of confusion requirement,244 a 
highly territory-sensitive element of trademark protection.  
Furthermore, the ACPA imposes liability without a showing that 
the domain name was used in commerce at all.245  The former sine 
qua non concept of use in commerce as an essential element of any 
trademark infringement or dilution claim in the United States is 
 
241 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 66, § 29:4, at 29-10 (noting that 
foreign marks famous in the United States “should be legally recognized in the United 
States”). 
242 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“[T]he right 
to a particular mark grows out of its use.”).  The opinion further discusses geographic 
scope of use-based rights. See id. at 97–104. 
243 See discussion supra Part I.C (explaining why “offline” trademark law failed to 
effectively protect marks in online activities). 
244 The ACPA in personam provision replaced that test with the “identical or 
confusingly similar” test, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000), which arguably bears much 
lower burden of proof than “likelihood of confusion.” See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster, 
LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D. Colo. 2000).  The in personam provision 
also imposes liability “without regard to the goods or services of the parties.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(A). 
245 ACPA does not include a requirement of “use in commerce” for in personam actions.  
In rem actions, however, are subject to the traditional limitations of the trademark 
infringement and dilution statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i). 
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also territory sensitive.246  Both the likelihood of confusion and use 
in commerce requirements were abandoned by the ACPA’s in 
personam provisions, inter alia, because those traditional concepts 
dictated territorial protection that was insufficient in the context of 
the Internet. 
As explained earlier, domain names are both unique and have 
global reach.  They are unique in that only one entity can register a 
single domain name worldwide.  Global reach means that domain 
names are instantly, cheaply, and simultaneously accessible and 
recognizable by Internet users all over the world, without territorial 
boundaries or limitations.  These characteristics of domain names 
had a major influence on the formulation of the ACPA, including 
its RDNH provision.  In sum, trademark territoriality theory 
provides a good explanation why U.S. law, and only U.S. law, 
should determine trademark rights and protection in U.S. territory.  
When the question is why should U.S. law, and only U.S. law, 
determine trademark protection of a Spanish mark that is arguably 
infringed on Spanish soil, the territoriality theory does not furnish 
the most satisfactory reasoning. 
C. Emerging Litigation Strategies 
Generally speaking, after more than three years of intensive 
litigation where the ACPA was heavily used against abusive 
registrants and registrations, it is now safe to say that this U.S. 
legislation virtually eliminated the benefits of cybersquatting in 
gTLDs to classic cybersquatters such as Toeppen247 and 
Zuccarini.248  Assuming the rulings of the Fourth and the First 
Circuits in Barcelona.com and Sallen, respectively, survive the 
rapid changes and evolution of technology and technology-related 
law, it should also be relatively safe for losing registrants to rely on 
the RDNH cause of action where the registration is determined not 
to violate U.S. law.  Consequently, registrants can protect their 
domain name registrations in U.S. courts from the fast and 
unpredictable UDRP process, where a panel can decide a dispute 
 
246 See supra note 78 (listing prominent examples of the “use in commerce” requirement 
in the Lanham Act). 
247 See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
248 See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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“in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and 
principles of law that it deems applicable.”249  After the 
Barcelona.com decision, federal courts are expected to decide on 
RDNH provision actions by taking into consideration only marks 
that are recognized under U.S. trademark law.  Hence, it becomes 
clear that a mark owner, whose rights in the mark are recognized 
only by a foreign system, will almost automatically lose in RDNH 
provision actions.  This alarming consequence calls for further 
discussion in possible litigation strategies.250 
1. The Registrant’s (Probably) Winning Strategy 
Suppose that you are a prospective registrant contemplating 
registration of a certain domain name, for example, 
<www.schlecker.com>.251  You are aware that there is a foreign 
mark (i.e., a non-U.S. protected mark) incorporated and held by a 
foreign commercial entity called Schlecker.252  You envision a 
possible dispute, and since a UDRP action is usually more 
attractive to mark owners than court litigation, it is more likely that 
the troubles will come from a UDRP complainant attacking your 
registration.253 
In order to maximize your chances of keeping the domain 
name, you may implement a simple strategy: choose a U.S. 
registrar with its principal office in the United States and register 
 
249 UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 15(a) (emphasis added). 
250 Litigation strategies refer generally to the behavior of parties before and during 
litigation which is intended to increase their chances of winning in court. 
251 It should be noted at the outset that this hypothetical does not speculate on your 
specific mens rea (i.e., the existence of bad faith or other types of mental state).  This is to 
avoid sensitivity of the hypothetical to different cybersquatting standards.  The 
hypothetical assumes that you are only aware of the existence of the foreign mark, no 
more and no less. 
252 For purposes of this hypothetical, one is aware that Schlecker is the name of a 
famous drugstore retailer chain in Germany.  The good news is, however, that Schlecker 
is not a registered mark in the United States, engages in no commercial activity, and does 
have a single American shop.  Additionally, the name is not generally familiar to U.S. 
consumers.  The better news, however, is that Schlecker neglected to register the domain 
<http://www.schlecker.com> before you came up with the idea. 
253 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing UDRP and its attractiveness to mark owners).  This 
assertion is especially valid in an international dispute, involving parties and rights from 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
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your domain name, making sure the owner of the registration is a 
U.S. entity with a U.S. address to appear in the registrar’s Whois 
database.254  Next, wait for the UDRP complaint to arrive and 
when it does, defend your registration in the UDRP process.255  If 
you win the UDRP proceeding256 and the mark owner decides not 
to challenge the result in court, the domain name is yours.257 
Conversely, if you lose under the UDRP, then file a RDNH 
provision suit in a U.S. federal court of mutual jurisdiction against 
that mark owner within ten business days.  As explained above, 
upon such filing the cancellation or transfer of your domain name 
will have an automatic stay until the matter is resolved in court or 
otherwise.258  The mark owner will have difficulty objecting to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction, since upon filing the UDRP 
complaint he or she agreed to submit to a court of mutual 
jurisdiction in adjudicating disputes concerning the domain 
name.259  Thus, the mark owner is arguably locked into the federal 
 
254 It appears that your own citizenship or domiciliary is irrelevant for the success of the 
strategy. 
255 You should remember to strictly comply with the procedural UDRP Rules, 
particularly with the rule 5(a) requirement of a timely response, as well as with the other 
rule 5 guidelines for submitting a response. See UDRP RULES, supra note 106, ¶ 5. 
256 Registrants, however, have a statistically better chance to lose a UDRP process than 
to win it. See Michael Geist, Fundamentally Fair.com?  An Update on Bias Allegations 
and the ICANN, at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/fairupdate.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) 
(examining 4,332 early UDRP decisions and finding that registrants statistically lose in a 
significant majority of the cases); see also Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of 
ICANN’s Uniform Dispute, Digital Convergence Center, at http://dcc.syr.edu/reports.htm 
(finding that registrants lost in almost 80 percent of the UDRP decision rendered in its 
first year of implementation) (Nov. 2000). 
257 Mark owners, as well as registrants, may challenge UDRP decisions in a court of 
competent jurisdiction: “The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements . . . shall 
not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of 
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative 
proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.” UDRP, supra note 98, 
¶ 4(k) (emphasis added).  A definition of “competent jurisdiction,” however, can be 
found neither in the Policy nor in the UDRP Rules. 
258 UDRP, supra note 98, ¶ 4(k). 
259 In its Barcelona.com opinion, the Fourth Circuit chronicled the district court’s 
proceedings in response to “the City Council’s argument that ‘failure to consider the 
basis for the [WIPO] decision would remove the basis for [this court’s] jurisdiction.’” See 
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623.  The court stated: 
[Barcelona.com, Inc.’s] complaint, brought in the Eastern District of 
Virginia . . . originally asserted three claims in three separate counts: a claim 
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court, no matter what connection he or she has with the forum.260  
Since the mark owner has only foreign trademark rights to 
vindicate, you may expect an almost certain victory in the federal 
court.261 
A possible wrinkle in this strategy appears when the mark 
owner launches a less typical offensive—skipping UDRP and 
suing you in court for trademark infringement or dilution.  Again, 
assuming no U.S. trademark rights are involved, the ACPA as 
applied by a U.S. court would probably leave mark owners with no 
recourse.262  If sued in a foreign court, however, with or without a 
 
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v); 
a claim for fraud and unfair competition; and a claim for tortious interference 
with prospective economic advantage.  In response to the City Council’s 
motion to dismiss on various jurisdictional grounds, [Barcelona.com, Inc.] 
voluntarily dismissed all claims except its claim under § 1114(2)(D)(v).  After 
the district court denied the City Council’s motion to dismiss, the City Council 
filed an answer, stating as one of its affirmative defenses: 
This court lacks jurisdiction over Defendant for any cause of action other 
than Plaintiff’s challenge to the arbitrator’s Order issued in the UDRP 
domain name arbitration proceeding. 
Id. (emphasis added).  It may be reasonable to assume that even Barcelona.com, Inc. 
believed, already in an early stage of litigation, that its only real chance to assert 
jurisdiction was through the application of the RDNH provision.  This aspect of the case 
also illustrates the city’s confusion regarding the difference between personal jurisdiction 
and subject matter jurisdiction. See supra note 220. 
260 In fact, the chief director of the city council “submitted an affidavit stating that ‘[t]he 
City does not own and is not using any trademarks in the United States, to identify any 
goods or services.’” Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 629. 
261 But see McNeil v. Stanley Works, No. 00-16557, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6762, at *3 
(9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2002) (doubting the contractual enforceability of a UDRP 
complainant’s forum choice with respect to challenges of UDRP decisions) (dictum). 
262 The ACPA’s in rem provision specifically includes only those marks protected under 
the Lanham Act against infringement or dilution or registered in the Patent and 
Trademark Office. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000).  The ACPA’s in personam 
provision more broadly covers “mark[s].” See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).  “Mark” is defined in 
the Lanham Act as “any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark.” 
Id. § 1127.  Additionally, the Sallen decision indicates that the term “mark owner” as 
used in the RDNH provision covers not only U.S. marks, but also any trademark. See 
Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing 15 
U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v)).  Accordingly, owners of foreign marks may arguably bring 
ACPA in personam actions in U.S. courts.  Since the Sallen decision is an RDNH 
decision and not an in personam decision, however, the author assumes that the holding is 
binding only in that context, although a more expansive reading is plausible.  For 
example, the Barcelona.com district court, discussing possible counterclaims of the city 
council, concluded that the ACPA in personam provision protected foreign marks. See 
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preceding UDRP process, you should fiercely object to that court’s 
jurisdiction.  If the challenge fails, you may need to prove 
legitimate use of the registration according to that jurisdiction’s 
rules.263 
Finally, even if you lose in the foreign court and that court 
issues an order in favor of the mark owner, it is not over yet.  You 
may still eventually prevail in a U.S. federal court.  To date, there 
is at least one such example: a federal district court ordered 
Verisign—which was the domain name registry—to ignore a 
Korean court decision ordering the Korean registrar not to transfer 
a domain name.264 
2. The Foreign-Mark Owner’s (Probably) Losing Strategy 
Now imagine yourself in the shoes of the hypothetical 
Schlecker (i.e., the owner of a foreign mark having its mark 
registered by a sophisticated registrant).  The best strategy is to 
skip the UDRP and sue directly where the mark is protected.265  
The reason is rather straightforward: the foreign mark owner 
knows that even if it wins under the UDRP, it may be forced to 
 
Barcelona.com, Inc., v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367, 
373–374 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617.  The Fourth Circuit, 
however, vacated this finding, concluding that the city never filed such counterclaims. 
330 F.3d at 629.  Thus, this issue remains open. 
263 Notice, however, that international jurisdictions would probably have to adjudicate 
the dispute according to traditional trademark law and some newly evolved doctrines 
created to deal with cybersquatting.  Thus far, it seems the United States is alone in 
legislating such a powerful tool against cybersquatting as the ACPA. See Sharrock, supra 
note 17, at 826–27 (comparing cybersquatting remedies available in U.S. courts to those 
available outside the United States).  But see infra notes 331, 344 (noting Japan’s 
cybersquatting protection). 
264 See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 625 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (finding that the Eastern District of Virginia was first in asserting in rem 
jurisdiction over the disputed domain name and concluding that the physical location of 
the registry in Virginia furnishes sufficient basis to assert in rem jurisdiction even though 
the registrar was located in Korea).  Although this was an in rem case with a peculiar set 
of circumstances, as distinguish from the RDNH hypothesis, it is still relevant to illustrate 
the following point: foreign courts’ power to effectuate their decisions is very limited 
compared to that of U.S. courts, sitting where registries typically reside.  When the door 
to a U.S. court is potentially opened before a losing party in a former, foreign proceeding, 
that court is not, arguendo, the final arbiter of the dispute. 
265 In this case, a mark owner would probably want to sue in Germany, where the mark 
is established. 
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later litigate in the United States, where it would probably lose.266  
On the other hand, if you find yourself in the shoes of the City 
Council of Barcelona, and you are already compelled to litigate in 
a U.S. court under the RDNH provision, your best strategy is 
probably to put all your efforts into strenuously objecting to the 
U.S. court’s in personam jurisdiction.267  You should do so despite 
the fact that you have already submitted to the U.S. court in the 
UDRP filing.268  If you fail in the jurisdictional stage, try to assert 
some protected rights under the Lanham Act, such as common law 
trademark rights.269  Obviously, once in federal court, you are in a 
much worse position than your opponent.  In fact, in light of the 
Barcelona.com decision, you have almost no hope there at all. 
3. The Partial Reverse Effect 
As mentioned, the UDRP brings the domain name dispute 
under the RDNH provision of the ACPA.270  The term “partial 
reverse effect” refers to a potential, new trend among owners of 
foreign marks to prefer foreign litigation and skip the UDRP 
option.271  It is only a “partial” effect because the UDRP remains 
attractive to U.S. mark owners.  The motivation for the effect is 
that the UDRP becomes a trap, possibly forcing owners of foreign 
 
266 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Barcelona.com indicated that a possible effect of an 
earlier UDRP proceeding would be to bring the dispute under the scope of the RDNH 
provision of the ACPA: 
[T]he ACPA authorizes a suit by a domain name registrant whose domain name 
has been suspended, disabled or transferred under that reasonable policy 
(including the UDRP) to seek a declaration that the registrant’s registration and 
use of the domain name involves no violation of the Lanham Act as well as an 
injunction returning the domain name. 
Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 625 (emphasis removed).  Absent such stage, the RDNH is 
probably inapplicable by its own terms. 
267 This is assuming that the RDNH provision actually requires this type of territorial 
jurisdiction. See supra discussion in Part II.B.3.  A subject-matter jurisdiction objection 
would probably not be convincing in light of Sallen. 
268 The hardship of convincing a court to accept such a problematic assertion is evident 
on its face. 
269 See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267–69 
(4th Cir. 2003) (providing an overview on common law trademark rights and citing 
relevant authorities). 
270 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
271 Especially in light of the litigation hurdles waiting for them in U.S. courts. See 
discussion  supra Part IV.C.2. 
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marks to litigate where they are very likely to lose.272  In other 
words, a possible cheap and fast victory under UDRP may lead to 
an expensive and extremely risky proceeding in a U.S. court.  The 
anticipated partial reverse effect might have a substantial adverse 
impact on the concept and function of UDRP.  A policy that is 
attractive only to U.S. mark owners may pose difficult legitimacy 
questions.273  In addition, the partial reverse effect may increase 
the volume of international domain name litigation, leading to 
conflicting decisions and posing a difficult test to the comity 
concept as applied by various courts.274  Is sum, a partial reverse 
effect is something to avoid and inhibit, especially if one believes 
that UDRP was essentially a good idea. 
D. The Big Picture and Its Critique 
In order to fully grasp the implication of the Barcelona.com 
decision, it is necessary to have a broader perspective of other 
recent, important case law, creating together the big picture of 
cybersquatting law in the United States.  Some of the most 
troubling issues encountered by courts applying the ACPA in 
international domain name disputes were due process, the 
extraterritorial effect, and the international comity problems.  This 
section briefly describes these problems and the ways U.S. courts 
dealt with the new challenges. 
1. Minimum Contacts Yes or No; What Does Shaffer Really 
Mean? 
U.S. courts generally found no minimum contacts sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction resulting from mere online presence 
 
272 See id. 
273 Indeed, UDRP legitimacy questions have already bothered commentators and 
invoked harsh criticism even without considering the described reverse effect. See, e.g., 
Froomkin, supra note 16 (critiquing the formation and use of ICANN as means to avoid 
proper public rulemaking); A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and 
AntiTrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (describing economic-competitive aspects of ICANN 
functions and its relationship with the U.S. government); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and 
the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000). 
274 See discussion on international comity infra Part IV.D.3. 
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of the defendant that could be accessed in that jurisdiction.275  
Additionally, minimum contacts generally could not be established 
by mere registration of the domain name with a registration 
authority located in the jurisdiction.276  Therefore, personal 
jurisdiction over alleged cybersquatters was often very hard to 
establish.277  The alternative was in rem jurisdiction.278 
Part I.B.2 of this Article provided a brief description of the 
three types of in rem jurisdiction.  The first type is true in rem 
jurisdiction, relevant when the action is concerning rights in a res 
located in the jurisdiction of plaintiff against the world, i.e., against 
any potential, non-specified right holder.279  Thus, in rem 
jurisdiction that determines the exclusive rights to use a certain 
domain name has a true in rem effect.280  In Shaffer v. Heitner, the 
Supreme Court was asked to resolve a question of quasi in rem II 
(sometimes called attachment) jurisdiction.281  The Shaffer court 
 
275 See discussion supra Part I.B.1; see also Shri Ram Chandra Mission v. 
Sahajmarg.org, 139 F. Supp. 2d 721, 722 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting the dismissal of the 
original in personam action due to lack of minimum contacts with the jurisdiction when 
the only contact was mere registration). 
276 Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that 
registration of the domain name in Virginia alone was not sufficient to establish 
minimum contacts with Virginia for establishing in personam jurisdiction). 
277 See discussion supra Part II.B.1; see also Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 
51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709–10 (E.D. Va. 1999) (plaintiff in a pre-ACPA case attempted to 
bring an in rem action against the domain names instead of an in personam action against 
the registrants), vacated due to a superseding statute by Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. 
Allporsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000) (table), and remanded in part by Porsche 
Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002). 
278 See Porsche Cars, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 709–10. 
279 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. a (1982) (noting that in a true in 
rem proceeding, but not necessarily in a quasi in rem proceeding, the judgment is binding 
even on persons to whom no notice of the proceeding was given). 
280 CNN I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001) (categorizing a domain name 
jurisdiction action as “true in rem,” where the owner of the res need not have minimum 
contacts with the forum). 
281 433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977).  The question there was whether a Delaware statute 
allowing in rem jurisdiction through sequestration of Delaware corporation shares owned 
by a non-resident defendant in order to compel personal appearance in an unrelated claim 
was constitutional. See id. at 189–95.  In the case, a shareholder brought a derivative 
action against the non-resident shareholder of a Delaware corporation in a matter 
unrelated to the rights in the shares.  Id. at 189–92.  Because the Delaware statute 
afforded an in rem action determining the rights of the parties unrelated to the “location” 
of the shares, this was a quasi in rem II (or “attachment”) case. 
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ruled that the Delaware statute providing attachment jurisdiction 
against a non-resident shareholder of a Delaware corporation must 
satisfy the minimum contacts standard of due process.282 
The controversy over the correct interpretation of Shaffer in the 
context of domain names disputes can be reduced to whether the 
minimum contacts standard also applies to true in rem 
jurisdiction—and thus also to the ACPA in rem provision—or 
whether minimum contacts are required solely in quasi in rem II 
jurisdictions.  Struggling with this question, courts generally have 
upheld the ACPA in rem actions even when the rights of a person 
having no minimum contacts with the jurisdiction were affected.283  
Such application an of the ACPA was justified by viewing as mere 
dicta statements in Shaffer which arguably require a more 
expansive application of the minimum contacts requirement to 
include all types of in rem actions.284 
2. The Extraterritorial Effect of the ACPA 
An extraterritorial application of domestic trademark law is a 
problem, as trademark law is territorial and each sovereign should 
be free to provide protection within its territory according to its 
 
282 Id. at 207 (citing Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
283 See CNN I, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001).  The court stated: 
[W]here, as here, the action is properly categorized as “true in rem,” there is no 
requirement that the owner or claimant of the res have minimum contacts with 
the forum.  More particularly, in an ACPA in rem action, it is not necessary that 
the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum contacts with the forum; it is 
enough, as here, that the registry is located in the forum. 
Id.  See also CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 527 (E.D. Va. 2001) (asserting jurisdiction by 
virtue of the deposit of the certificate of registration by the registrar with the court as 
establishing in rem jurisdiction and taking a narrow reading of Shaffer); Harrods Ltd. v. 
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the ACPA in rem provision); CNN Appeal, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 
152846, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (citing Harrods, 302 F.3d at 225). 
284 See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209.  The court stated: 
Thus, although the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might 
suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the 
litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s 
jurisdiction.  If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now 
thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum. 
Id. 
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own domestic rules.285  The guiding Supreme Court opinion on the 
issue of extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act is Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co.286  The Bulova Court, acknowledging the 
problematic aspect of applying the Lanham Act in disputes 
involving extraterritorial effect, held that such an application was 
appropriate only where the infringing activity adversely affects 
U.S. commerce.287  In essence, the Bulova decision dictates that 
extraterritorial application of U.S. trademark law is appropriate 
only when (1) defendant is a U.S. citizen (or has extensive contacts 
and presence in the United States); (2) defendant’s conduct (in a 
foreign country) affects U.S. commerce; and (3) there is no conflict 
between U.S. law and the foreign country’s law as a result of 
applying the Lanham Act.288 
The relevance of the extraterritorial effect doctrine is evident in 
cases of international domain name disputes, where application of 
the ACPA has immediate international effects.  Clearly, a U.S. 
court imposing the ACPA rules in a gTLD dispute determines what 
each and every Internet user in the world will see—or will not 
see—when clicking the corresponding Internet address.  At the 
same time, such court has control over the availability of domain 
name registrations to foreign actors, regardless of their nationality 
or contacts with the U.S. forum.  The problem is especially acute 
in applying the in rem provision absent of any of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine constraints.289 
U.S. courts, evaluating the extraterritorial effects of their ruling 
in domain name disputes, generally do not consider such effects as 
a constraint.  For example, the federal court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia, in its second opinion in the Cable News Network L.P. 
 
285 See supra Parts I.C.1, IV.B (discussing the territoriality concepts in trademark law). 
286 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
287 See id. at 285–87. 
288 See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642–43 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(analyzing Bulova); see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A 
Troubling New Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 492–
500 (2003) (analyzing Bulova, Vanity Fair, and U.S. jurisprudence regarding 
extraterritorial effect doctrine). 
289 See Nguyen, supra note 288, at 544–45 (enumerating the extraterritoriality doctrine’s 
limitations and noting that none of them exist in the ACPA in rem provision). 
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v. CNNews.com case (“CNN II”),290 concluded that 
<www.cnnnews.com>—a Chinese news Web site which registered 
with a Chinese registrar291 that displayed text almost entirely in the 
Chinese language, offered no goods for sale outside China, and 
was ostensibly directed solely at Internet users outside of the 
United States—constituted use in U.S. commerce and affected U.S. 
commerce.292  The court’s reasoning for this conclusion was quite 
remarkable.  First, the court found that the Chinese Web site’s 
“effect or impact” on U.S. commerce “results from the global 
nature of the Internet.”293  Second, the court concluded that 
“‘.com’ is essentially an American top-level domain.”294  Thus, the 
Chinese Web site was offering news services in the United States, 
and because the Cable News Network (“CNN”) was a famous 
mark in America, U.S. commerce was affected.295  The result 
suggests that the extraterritoriality doctrine does not stop U.S. 
courts from applying the Lanham Act in gTLD registrations.  
While one court further expressed the worry that U.S. marks would 
 
290 See CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001).  The district court issued two 
opinions in this case, the first of which denied a dismissal and the second of which 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, Cable News Network L.P. 
291 After the controversy over the Web site had arisen, but before the plaintiff filed its 
complaint, the defendant changed the registrar from NSI, a U.S. firm, to Eastern 
Communication Company Ltd., a Chinese registrar. See CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 514. 
292 Id. at 517–18. 
293 Id. at 517. 
294 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
295 Id. at 517–18.  Some other courts followed this approach. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. 
v. Aol.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Va. 2003).  The court stated: 
Yet, this is not an “extraterritorial application” of the Lanham Act or the 
ACPA, because [Public Interest Registry], the “.org” registry, is located in this 
district, and the transfer order would not “specifically enjoin any activity 
outside the United States; instead, [the order] would be limited to ordering [the 
registry] in this [district] to transfer ownership of [the] domain name.” 
Id. (quoting CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.29); see also Internet Billions Domains, 
Inc. v. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C., No. 01-5417, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11805 (E.D. 
Pa. May 31, 2002).  In Internet Billions, the court found that “the mere fact that the 
internet allows for worldwide access does not strip an American court of its subject 
matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act over activities directed at the United States.” 
Id. at *16.  The court continued: “As the ‘.org’ suffix with no country code in the domain 
name for a Web site that uses English has been held to target users in the United States, 
we find the allegations that [plaintiff’s] activities were directed toward the United States 
to be sufficient.” Id. (citing Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racism et 
L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). 
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be infringed without recourse by using foreign registries such as 
ccTLD,296 another had the practical advice for foreign registrants 
who think that the U.S. process is unfair—register with a ccTLDs 
in the first instance.297 
3. International Comity Considerations 
The extraterritorial effect doctrine is one manifestation of a 
more general concept of international comity.298  The fundamental 
assumption of comity is the recognition by one legal system 
applying its law in its territory of the potential involvement of 
interests of other sovereign’s law system.299  A relevant aspect of 
comity “ordinarily requires that courts of a separate sovereign not 
interfere with concurrent proceedings based on the same transitory 
 
296 See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 624 (E.D. Va. 
2003).  The court stated: 
[A] desire to avoid United States jurisdiction may cause foreign registrants to 
choose to use domain names within their respective country code top-level 
domains, whose registries are located in and operated by the foreign countries, 
rather than the currently popular ‘generic’ domain names such as “.com” and 
“.net.”  The result may be an increasing number of domain names registered 
out of the reach of United States jurisdiction, but accessible to United States 
users through the universal domain name system, which in turn will pose a 
serious challenge to the enforcement of United States trademark rights on the 
Internet. 
Id. 
297 See Am. Online, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 457.  The court stated that foreign registrants 
using the <.org> TLD “chose, in effect, to play Internet ball in American cyberspace.  
Had they wished to avoid an American ACPA suit and transfer order and American 
jurisdiction altogether, they might have chosen to register the infringing domain name in 
top-level domains with solely foreign registries and registrars.” Id. 
298 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law observes: 
[C]omity has been variously conceived and defined.  A well-known definition 
is: “Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the 
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.  But it is the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” 
Supra note 19, § 101 cmt. e (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see 
also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Supra note 19, § 403 cmt. a. 
299 See Guyot, 159 U.S. at 164 (“[Comity] is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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claim, at least until a judgment is reached in one action.”300  The 
practice of extending comity, however, is generally accepted 
whenever the foreign court has proper jurisdiction and enforcement 
does not prejudice the rights of U.S. citizens or violate U.S. public 
policy.301  Courts applying the ACPA in the context of 
international domain name disputes often recognize the need for 
comity analysis in decisions influencing other sovereigns’ legal 
interests—in particular, when the in rem provision was put into 
action.302  U.S. courts generally do not consider comity principles a 
serious obstacle when applying the ACPA in international domain 
name disputes, however.303 
One court evaluating the international implication of applying 
the in rem provision provided a relatively elaborate comity 
discussion.  In GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantafe.com, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered 
whether it should defer to a previously issued injunction issued by 
a Korean court regarding a domain name.304  The court discussed 
at length the “Princess Lida” doctrine,305 which provides that in 
certain types of in rem actions, the first federal court to assert 
jurisdiction excludes other courts’ adjudication.306  Since the 
 
300 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 939 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
301 V’Soske, Inc. v. Vsoske.com, No. 00 Civ. 6099, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5025, at *19 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (citing several Second Circuit authorities). 
302 V’Soske, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5025, at *19. 
303 See, e.g., CNN Appeal, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003), 
(affirming lower court’s finding of jurisdiction without mentioning international comity 
concerns); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 302–03 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(indicating, in dicta, that international comity is not offended by the in rem ACPA 
provision, since Congress identified the U.S. registrar or registry of the domain name as 
the nexus to the U.S. jurisdiction) (citing H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 14 (1999)); Am. 
Online, Inc., v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455–57 (E.D. Va. 2003) (concluding that 
international comity does not bar an injunction directed at the <.org> registry to transfer a 
domain name when the foreign registrar refuses to cooperate with the court); 
GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 626 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(determining that U.S. federal court was not restricted by a prior foreign court order on 
the same domain name since the court in Virginia was first to assert jurisdiction, and 
since public policy and overriding U.S. interests justify such result). 
304 GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 617–26. 
305 Id. at 624–25. 
306 Id. (citing SEC v. Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Al-Abood 
v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2000); Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. 
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GlobalSantaFe court found that it was first in time to assert 
jurisdiction, it was “not obligated under the rule in Princess Lida to 
cede jurisdiction over the domain name in light of the subsequent 
order issued by the Korean court.”307  The GlobalSantaFe court 
further concluded that comity did not bar the application of the 
first-in-time rule under the circumstances.308 
The application of a first-in-time rule in the context of the 
ACPA in rem provision raises the concern of a consequent 
“litigation race” situation, in which parties are encouraged to file 
suit before their opponent does.  For example, as soon as the cloud 
of forthcoming dispute between a U.S. mark owner and a foreign 
registrant emerges, and where application of the in rem provision 
is in the vicinity, parties improve their position in a subsequent, 
indeed inevitable, court litigation, if they are the first to file an 
action in a court sitting in their preferred jurisdiction.309  Such a 
race may provide a negative incentive for parties considering 
whether to turn first to alternative dispute resolution methods.  If 
international comity and the first-in-time rule are taken seriously 
enough to influence litigation strategies, international parties are 
more likely to elect court litigation and are likely to choose it 
earlier. 
4. The ACPA Laundry Machine Effect and Its Paradox 
The problems discussed above regarding application of the 
ACPA in international domain name disputes were especially 
pertinent to the in rem provision.  U.S. courts did not consider 
those problems as a bar to their application of the ACPA in 
 
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1939)).  Although originally developed in the context 
of federalism, this doctrine has since been applied to federal cases with parallel 
proceedings underway in another country. Id. at 625 (citing Banner Fund, 211 F.3d at 
611; Dailey v. Nat’l Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
307 GlobalSantaFe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 625. 
308 See id. at 626 (finding that (i) U.S. and Korean proceedings were not concurrent; (ii) 
the Korean court proceeding was intended to frustrate the enforcement of a subsequent 
order of the U.S. court; (iii) enforcing the U.S. judgment is supported by significant U.S. 
public policy interests). 
309 Such “litigation race” scenario contemplates a potential in rem action in the United 
States filed by the mark owner against some type of declaratory judgment action filed by 
the actual registrant in a foreign country, attempting to establish his or her rights in using 
the domain name. 
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difficult cases.  Some commentators have raised serious concerns 
regarding this trend, however.  They have argued that the in rem 
provision, as applied, is unconstitutional as violating due 
process,310 that the extraterritorial reach of the ACPA is 
unreasonable under principles of international law prescriptive 
jurisdiction,311 that certain applications of the ACPA raise 
troubling questions concerning the overreaching of U.S. courts,312 
and that the ACPA is violates comity principles.313  Without the 
need to address the merits of those assertions, this Article 
introduces another troubling aspect of the ACPA—its RDNH 
provision.  The Sallen court teaches that any mark, U.S. or foreign, 
may be subject to the RDNH provision once a UDRP losing 
registrant exercises it.314  The Barcelona.com court, however, 
teaches that only owners of U.S. marks may successfully defend 
the domain names in a RDNH action in U.S. courts.315  In such 
cases, the ACPA becomes a clearinghouse, or a laundry machine, 
of foreign trademark rights in domain name disputes.  Considering 
that the vast majority of UDRP challenges are commenced in U.S. 
courts,316 this is a serious problem indeed.  Such a result is likely to 
encourage forum shopping in international domain name disputes, 
a trend that is already facilitated by the UDRP Rules.317 
In some respects, the RDNH laundry machine effect is much 
more problematic than the in rem provision.  In order to succeed in 
an in rem action, the plaintiff-mark-owner electing to sue in the 
United States must first establish the likelihood of confusion or 
 
310 Struve & Wagner, supra note 11, at 1006–18 (analyzing Shaffer as referring to all 
types of in rem jurisdictions and concluding that the ACPA in rem provision, lacking the 
requirement of minimum contacts, is unconstitutional). 
311 Nguyen, supra note 288, at 552. 
312 Bhanu K. Sadasivan, Jurisprudence Under the In Rem Provision of the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 255 (2003). 
313 See Steven J. Coran, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act’s In 
Rem Provision: Making American Trademark Law the Law of the Internet?, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 169, 194–95 (2001). 
314 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Sallen ruling). 
315 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s Barcelona.com ruling). 
316 Efroni, supra note 24, at 367 & n.200 (finding that until late 2002 more than ninety-
four percent of all court challenged UDRP decisions were commenced in the United 
States). 
317 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing UDRP rule 3(xiii)(b)). 
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dilution and that the domain name was used in U.S. commerce.318  
Conversely, a registrant suing a foreign mark owner in a U.S. court 
under the RDNH provision must only show (1) registration; (2) 
suspension, disablement, or transfer of the registration in 
accordance with dispute resolution policy; (3) notice; and (4) that 
the plaintiff’s registration or use of the domain name is not 
unlawful under the Lanham Act.319  This burden of proof is light, 
especially if the owner is trying to avoid application of the Lanham 
Act by asserting no use in U.S. commerce at all.320  By definition, 
foreign marks are generally not protected by the Lanham Act; thus, 
owners of foreign marks have no defense but to try to assert U.S. 
trademark rights through use in U.S. commerce. 
This Article takes the above assertion one step further: the 
laundry machine effect is inevitable, hopelessly rooted in the 
ACPA as a statute that regulates international cybersquatting 
disputes according to domestic trademark law.  For example, the 
defendant, a foreign mark owner, challenged the court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction in the Sallen case, arguing that the RDNH 
provision applied only to U.S. registered marks.321  The court, in 
turn, correctly pointed out that such reading of the statute would 
bring about absurd results, leaving registrants unprotected against 
reverse domain name hijackers so long as the hijackers are not 
registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.322 
Thus, out of the two possible alternatives, the court chose the 
only one that is logically and reasonably acceptable.  In the 
Barcelona.com case, the court was asked to ascertain the scope of 
the RDNH provision, namely under which circumstances a losing 
registrant is protected under this provision.323  Again, the court 
 
318 See supra note 235 (noting that in order to succeed in an in rem action, plaintiff must 
establish infringement or dilution claims in accordance with regular Lanham Act 
requirements). 
319 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the Barcelona.com court’s interpretation of the 
RDNH provision). 
320 See supra note 260 and accompanying text (noting that this was exactly the theory of 
the city council in the Barcelona.com case and a prominent reason for its failure to obtain 
the domain name). 
321 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2001). 
322 Id. at 25; see also supra text accompanying notes 173–79. 
323 Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d 617, 623–29 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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faced two possible, alternative readings—registration must not 
violate only the Lanham Act, or, it must not violate any relevant 
trademark law involved.  And again, the court upheld the reading 
that is not only compatible with the plain language of the ACPA 
and with trademark territoriality principles, but also the only 
logically and reasonably acceptable alternative.324  As mentioned 
earlier, the opposite reading would mean that under the ACPA, 
U.S. courts adjudicating RDNH actions should determine 
trademark rights protected by any possible relevant jurisdiction.325 
Unfortunately, the Sallen and the Barcelona.com decisions 
remain logical and reasonable only when they stand alone.  The 
combination of the two results in the above-mentioned laundry 
machine effect.  Even under the assumption that the RDNH 
provision requires meeting U.S. constitutional personal jurisdiction 
tests,326 and even underestimating the effect of the UDRP Rules in 
helping registrants to establish such jurisdiction, the result for the 
owners of foreign marks is still very harsh.  Considering the 
arguable expansion of U.S. personal jurisdiction rules in the digital 
age,327 the result may be not only harsh but also probable.  It 
should be difficult to justify such a system as meeting the standard 
of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”328 
 
E. Possible Foreign Reactions 
In the “White Paper,”329 a statement of policy published by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(“NTIA”), the U.S. executive branch explicitly recognized the 
need for international cooperation in regulating and controlling the 
 
324 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Barcelona.com holding and the court’s 
determination that Spanish law is inapplicable). 
325 See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the Barcelona.com holding). 
326 See supra text accompanying notes 178–83 (arguing that this question is still rather 
open). 
327 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing in personam jurisdiction). 
328 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
329 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, Statement of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 
31,741, 31,746 (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper]. 
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DNS.330  The ACPA, however, is an example of a combined U.S. 
legislative and the U.S. judiciary activism, which leads to a de 
facto, unilateral Internet regulation.  Such activism might be 
conceived as an intimidating message sent to other Internet 
nations, with implications that go far beyond private domain name 
disputes. 
It is reasonable to assume that U.S. treatment of international 
domain name disputes may invoke a strong reaction among foreign 
countries.  One possible development could be that other 
sovereigns would enact their own anticybersquatting legislation.331  
The second possible development hypothesized by commentators 
was the scenario of “segmentation” of the Internet, as a result of a 
power struggle between America and other sovereigns.332  Under 
 
330 For example, in paragraph 11 thereof, the White Paper states: “The U.S. Government 
believes that the Internet is a global medium and that its technical management should 
fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users.  We recognize the need for and fully 
support mechanisms that would ensure international input into the management of the 
domain name system.  In withdrawing the U.S. Government from DNS management and 
promoting the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names 
and addresses [a function that now ICANN fulfills], a key U.S. Government objective has 
been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in 
decisions affecting the Internet’s technical management.” White Papers, supra note 329.  
This aspect of the U.S. approach was sometimes called the “hands off” policy, assuring 
no direct, unilateral/governmental regulation of the DNS, at least not in the technical 
sense. 
331 At least in Japan, this is no longer mere possibility.  The recently amended Unfair 
Competition Prevention Law (“UCPL”) provides in article 2(1)(xii) a new 
anticybersqatting cause of action. See Brent Yonehara, 
LANDOFTHERISINGSUN.CO.JP: A Review of Japan’s Protection of Domain Names 
Against Cybersquatting, 43 IDEA 207, 221–24 (2003).  The amended UCPL defines as 
actionable unfair competition “[t]he act of acquiring rights or preserving the right to use a 
domain name that is identical or similar to the indication of another person’s particular 
product (i.e., the name, trade name, trademark mark or other indication of goods or 
services of another person’s) for the purpose of gaining unfair profits or causing harm to 
another.” Id. at 221–22; see also Yamasaki Law Office, New Developments in Japanese 
Law: Trademark Issues on the Internet in Japan, at http://www.yamasaki-
law.com/practice_5.htm#r5 (Aug. 30, 2001) (describing purpose of the Amendment). 
332 See Struve & Wagner, supra note 11, at 1032–34.  Describing the phenomenon of 
segmentation, the authors state: 
Segmentation arises when the various root server systems in use are either in 
conflict, or do not accurately reflect the content of other root servers . . . 
resulting in, for example, a request for www.yahoo.com yielding a different 
web page in different networks . . . . 
We predict that segmentation would result under the following circumstances: 
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this scenario, countries with enough resources, expertise, 
technology, and motivation would create a parallel Internet 
infrastructure with an alternative, competing domain name 
system.333  If and when such a development occurs, it is likely to 
result in a considerable reduction of benefits to Internet users, and 
probably a radical change in the status of the Internet as a prime 
source of information.334  These two possible types of reactions are 
likely to bring more harm than good, both to the United States and 
other Internet nations.  The apprehension and frustration felt by 
other countries as a result of the current situation are indeed very 
real, and are likely to grow as U.S. interference with foreign 
trademark rights intensifies.335 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A BETTER MODEL: THE INTERNATIONAL 
ANTICYBERSQUATTING TREATY 
This part consists of four sections.  Section A highlights the 
problems of a unilateral approach to cybersquatting regulation and 
adjudication such as the one manifested in the ACPA.  Section B 
presents a detailed alternative, a multilateral approach manifested 
in an international cybersquatting treaty scheme (“IACT”), which 
is based on ten fundamental principles.  Section C tests the 
 
First, a new root server system . . . could create conflicts with the existing 
public root server system . . . . 
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, segmentation must be considered 
a potential response by one or more sovereigns to any others’ attempts to exert 
unwanted regulatory influence over the domain name system . . . . 
. . . . 
As should be easily apparent, segmentation of the domain name system would 
dramatically decrease its value to the Internet user community. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
333 See id. 
334 Id. at 1034.  One possible consequence of such segmentation is that it would no 
longer be possible to universally rely on any Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) as a 
source of reference, since the same Internet address might randomly yield different 
results. See id. 
335 See Christopher P. Rains, Comment, A Domain by Any Other Name: Forging 
International Solutions for the Governance of Internet Domain Names, 14 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 355, 371 (2000) (noting the implications of imposing a single’s nation law on all 
Internet-faring nations go largely unnoticed among U.S. policymakers and how the 
frustration felt by foreign plaintiffs—and indeed foreign courts—is very real). 
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proposed model using two methods; first it applies the 
Barcelona.com dispute in a world governed by the proposed IACT, 
examines the expected outcome, and compares it with the actual 
outcome in that case.  Second, it provides a more general game-
theory model that proves the assertions of forum shopping 
motivation and the advantages of the new scheme over the present 
one.  Section D argues that the proposed model should be attractive 
and advantageous both to the United States and other Internet 
nations.  While doing so, it examines some possible weaknesses of 
the proposed model and offers some answers. 
A. Unilateral Approach: A Lose-Lose Situation 
If other nations react to the United States’ current policy by 
enacting their own domestic cybersquatting laws, the situation may 
only get worse.  A growth in the number of conflicting decisions 
regarding the same dispute in different national courts would have 
grave consequences on legal certainty, fairness, and international 
comity, and thus should be strongly discouraged.336  In addition, it 
is questionable whether such laws would have a significant effect 
on disputes that arguably involve U.S. public policy interests.337  
As noted earlier, U.S. courts have already demonstrated an 
aggressive enforcement approach, ordering registries and a 
registrar to effectuate their decisions.338  The fact that the registries 
of all major, unrestricted gTLDs are located on U.S. soil339 makes 
 
336 After the anti-cybersquatting bill passed the House of Representatives, Clinton White 
House spokesman Joe Lockhart stated, “We believe that fundamentally we’d be walking 
down the wrong road if we legislated a cybersquatting law and then the 200 or so Internet 
countries around the world started legislating their own rules and laws.” Statement by Joe 
Lockhart, White House Press Secretary (Oct. 28, 1999), noted in Springer, supra note 8, 
at 359 & n.281. 
337 See, e.g., V’Soske, Inc. v. Vsoske.com, No. 00 Civ. 6099, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5025, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (concluding that even when another foreign court 
may properly assert jurisdiction over a dispute, it does not prejudice the rights of U.S. 
citizens or violate domestic public policy). 
338 See CNN II, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001); see also supra note 295 and 
accompanying text (describing recent U.S. case law finding overriding U.S. interests in 
applying the ACPA to international disputes); supra notes 152–53 and accompanying 
text (describing U.S. courts’ enforcement measures against registration authorities in 
order to give effect to their rulings). 
339 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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a conflicting foreign legal process in many cases unenforceable, 
and indeed, meaningless.340  Put differently, a U.S. injunction 
against the gTLD registry has proven to be stronger then any 
conflicting foreign law or judicial order.341  Indeed, since physical 
control over Internet infrastructure does matter,342 U.S. courts are 
potentially the final arbiters in many cybersquatting disputes.343 
Moreover, it is likely that legislation of foreign 
anticybersquatting laws regulating gTLD registrations, if and when 
it comes,344 would be as problematic as the ACPA and suffer from 
similar symptoms.  These laws would probably afford effective 
protection to marks recognized by the relevant national trademark 
law, and at the same time, afford little, if any, protection to 
cybersquatted marks that the national law does not protect.  Such a 
result occurred in the case of the ACPA as applied in the 
 
340 See GlobalSanteFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 626–27 (E.D. 
Va. 2003) (issuing an injunction against the <.com> registry to enforce its judgment and 
disable the domain name until it is transferred to the mark owner, despite a Korean 
court’s order telling the Korean registrar not to do so); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. 
Aol.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D. Va. 2003) (issuing an injunction against the 
<.org> registry to enforce the transfer of the domain name to the mark owner when the 
foreign registrar refused to cooperate with the court). 
341 Id. 
342 Struve & Wagner, supra note 11 at 992–93.  The authors observe that the regulatory 
authority of a sovereign with the principal infrastructure of the domain name system 
located in its territory “can be grounded in either the widely-accepted principles of 
prescriptive jurisdiction or the de facto result of the physical location of elements of the 
domain name system.” Id. at 992.  The authors continue: 
In the prescriptive jurisdiction case, the location of certain elements, 
specifically the root or TLD servers, within a sovereign’s territory will in 
almost all cases provide at least substantial international legal support for the 
assertion of jurisdiction . . . de facto control can be exerted via the reality of the 
technology and geography.  In either event, the same basic point holds: 
geography matters. 
Id. at 992–93 (footnote omitted).  In these contexts, geography matters not only as a 
prescriptive jurisdiction element, but also regarding jurisdiction to enforce. See supra 
note 21. 
343 Nguyen, supra note 288, at 535–40 (warning against the formation of an in rem court 
by default in the Eastern District of Virginia, resulting from the fact that major gTLD 
registries are located there). 
344 For example, see supra note 331 (noting the new Japanese anticybersqatting 
provision).  Japan’s law probably protects against cybersquatting in gTLDs in addition to 
<.jp> domains, albeit protection is based on different principles than in the United States. 
See Yonehara, supra note 331, at 221–24 (2003) (describing Japan’s protection against 
cybersquatting and comparing it to the ACPA). 
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Barcelona.com ruling, and such a result should be avoided instead 
of replicated. 
An interesting question is whether foreign mark owners should 
take the advice offered by the Eastern District of Virginia.  In two 
recent decisions, this court used language that suggested ccTLD 
registrations enjoyed ACPA immunity.345  Further, ccTLD 
registrations are not subject to the compulsory UDRP, unless 
voluntarily adopting it.346  Can ccTLD registrations solve the 
problem of international domain name disputes?  Probably not.347  
The fact that ccTLD registries are subject to regulation and control 
of the corresponding national governments is a matter of mere U.S. 
government courtesy.348  There in no guarantee against the 
following scenario: one day, the U.S Department of Commerce 
concludes that certain ccTLD registrations are posing serious 
threats to U.S. interests.  Therefore, ICANN is delegated the 
responsibility to make sure that U.S. interests, including trademark 
rights, are not infringed through such registrations.349  Though it 
could be argued that such a scenario is very unlikely, it is still 
technically possible.  A careful reading of some of recent U.S. 
court decisions may be regarded as an implied call by the courts 
for putting order in the unruly ccTLD system.350  More 
importantly, in the context of the RDNH provision, this solution is 
 
345 See supra note 296–97 and accompanying text. 
346 Sharrock, supra note 17, at 841–42 (noting that ccTLD registrars are not required to 
bind their registrants to the UDRP, although country code registration authorities can 
voluntarily adopt the policy). 
347 This issue may require a more comprehensive discussion.  The Article, however, 
only touches upon some arguments indicating that ccTLD registrations as a 
comprehensive solution is inadequate. 
348 See von Arx & Hagen, supra note 4, ¶ 20.  The authors observe: 
Technically, the ccTLDs are subdomains of the “root domain” created by the 
U.S. government and “contained” in the root zone file.  Despite the U.S. 
reservation of technical control over the A root, the U.S. government states that 
“[n]ational governments now have, and will continue to have, authority to 
manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs,” thereby attempting to 
downplay the influence that the U.S. may indirectly have over the policies of 
nations foreign to the U.S. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
349 See id.  The U.S. control over the A root server provides the power to create, 
redelegate, or destroy ccTLDs. See id. ¶ 2. 
350 See supra note 296. 
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meaningless.  Foreign mark owners never chose gTLD 
registrations in such cases—the registrant did.  In fact, the foreign 
owner may have neither gTLD nor ccTLD registrations, yet still be 
forced to submit to ACPA rules in U.S. courts. 
B. Possible Solution: The IACT 
The discussion thus far suggests that the evil is rooted in the 
national/unilateral approach to cybersquatting regulation and 
adjudication.  The first clear example for the inadequacy of this 
approach is, of course, the ACPA itself.  The IACT offers an 
alternative.  A draft of the IACT would be prepared by an 
international organization with recognized specialty, experience, 
and reputation, such as WIPO.  Such a treaty shall be signed by all 
nations wishing to become “member states” and willing to adhere 
to its principles.  The important IACT fundamentals are 
summarized by the following ten principles: 
(1) Domestic Legislation: All member states must legislate 
within a certain timeframe domestic anticybersqutting laws 
protecting against abusive registrations of domain names 
incorporating trademarks.351  The heart of this legislation 
would be a cybersquatting standard that must not be lower 
than the “minimum standard” stipulated in the IACT.352  
This law should also include a RDNH provision, protecting 
registrants against unjustified claims, an in rem 
 
351 An example of implementing international intellectual property standards through 
domestic legislation by member-states can be found in articles 44–49 of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.  See Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  For congressional approval of 
the TRIPS and WTO Agreements, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 101-103, 108 Stat. 4809, 4814-19 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 17, 
19, and 35 U.S.C.). See also J.H. Reichman, Comment, Enforcing the Enforcement 
Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 335, 340–41 (1997) (describing 
the relevant implementation and enforcement articles of the TRIPS Agreement). 
352 See infra text accompanying note 355 (discussing principle 2). 
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provision,353 and other essential features of effective 
anticybersquatting legislation.354 
(2) Minimum Standard: The IACT shall stipulate an 
agreed-upon minimum standard for unlawful 
cybersquatting.  A member state should be allowed, if it 
deems appropriate, to incorporate a higher standard in its 
domestic legislation (i.e., a wider range of Internet 
activities would fall under the definition of unlawful 
cybersquatting).  No standard lower than the IACT 
minimum standard shall be permitted, however.355 
(3) Mutual Protection: All member states should be obliged 
to protect against cybersquatting marks recognized and 
protected by any other member state.  In a cybersquatting 
dispute involving a mark protected under the other member 
state’s law, a member state generally should adjudicate the 
cybersquatting dispute in accordance with its own domestic 
anticybersquatting norms, and under the assumption that 
the mark is valid and protectable. 
(4) Judicial Assistance: In order to determine whether there 
is a protected foreign mark, or “IACT mark,” involved, 
member states shall create a system of “judicial assistance.”  
 
353 A recommended in rem provision should establish jurisdiction only in cases in which 
the registrant cannot be found or identified.  Due to the conceptually elastic of 
interpretation of where exactly the physical location of a domain name is, making it 
eligible for in rem actions, contracting member states may reach an acceptable definition 
of the appropriate adjudicating forum in those instances.  In any event, as suggested in 
principle 10, the International Anticybersquatting Treaty (“IACT”) generally provides 
personal jurisdiction when the opponent is identified and connected to some other 
member state.  This provision should cover the vast majority of disputes in the first place. 
354 The assumption is that member states have already at least minimal trademark 
protection in place, and that such states adhere to universally accepted concepts of fair 
judicial process and commitment to the rule of law. 
355 A prominent example of such an attempt to ascertain internationally accepted 
minimum standard against cybersquatting was demonstrated in WIPO’s final report to 
ICANN, in the spirit of which the UDRP was crafted. See WIPO, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS ¶¶ 170–77 (1999) (defining abusive 
registration) [hereinafter WIPO FINAL REPORT], available at http://wipo2.wipo.int-
/process1/report/finalreport.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).  But see Helfer & 
Dinwoodie, supra note 101, at 168–70 (questioning the authority and legitimacy of 
WIPO to create the standards embodied in the final report). 
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In a situation described in principle 3 above and in any 
other instance where foreign trademark rights should be 
ascertained, the “adjudicating court,” or the court where the 
complaint is filed, would submit a query to a proper court 
in the jurisdiction where the mark arguably is protected, the 
“assisting court.”  The query shall be in a standard format 
and limited in scope.  It should ask the assisting court one 
question, and one question only: whether the arguably 
cybersquatted mark is protected by law in the assisting 
court’s jurisdiction. 
(5) Determination of IACT Mark: A final judicial 
determination of the assisting court shall be decisive on the 
matter of whether the mark constitutes an IACT mark and 
whether if falls within the scope of the IACT’s authority.356 
(6) Choice of Law I: If (i) a plaintiff-mark-owner files an 
IACT action in a court in a member state different from the 
member state under which law the mark is arguably 
protected, as opposed to the “state of origin” (i.e., where 
the mark is protected); and (ii) the standard for 
cybersquatting protection in the adjudicating court is higher 
than the standard in the state of origin, then the lower 
standard of the two should be applied.357 
 
356 A possible appeal procedure may also be considered in this context.  Under such a 
procedure, the aggrieved party would be able to appeal to a higher court in the assisting 
court’s jurisdiction.  In such a case, the final judicial finding in that jurisdiction would be 
decisive. 
357 Here, a mark owner is choosing a forum that does not protect the mark in its 
domestic legislation.  Such a rule is important to prevent forum shopping of mark owners, 
suing in the member state with the highest standard of protection.  In case that a mark is 
arguably protected in more that one member state, two situations should be regulated: (1) 
the mark is arguably protected both in the adjudication court and in other member states; 
(2) the mark is arguably protected only in some other multiple member states.  In the 
former situation, the better rule is that the adjudication court’s standard would apply 
(even in a case in which the standards in the other jurisdictions are lower).  The rationale 
is to allow a mark owner who files an action in a jurisdiction where the mark is protected 
to enjoy the domestic cybersquatting protection standard.  In the latter situation, the 
lowest standard involved should be compared with the adjudication court’s standard, and 
the lower between the two should be applied.  The aim here is to discourage a mark 
owner from filing an action in a jurisdiction where the mark is not protected in an attempt 
to benefit from its higher protection standard. 
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(7) Choice of Law II: If (i) a plaintiff-registrant who lost a 
domain name registration in a UDRP or other similar 
proceeding brings an RDNH complaint in an adjudicating 
court residing in a jurisdiction different from the state of 
origin; and (ii) the standard of the adjudicating court is 
lower than the standard of the state of origin, then the 
higher standard of protection should apply.358 
(8) Choice of Law III: Regarding the factual determination 
of which standard is higher and which standard should be 
applied in a specific case, the adjudicating court shall have 
sole discretion.359 
(9) First in Time, First in Right: If the adjudicating court 
determines that both parties have cognizant rights in the 
mark under any of the trademark laws involved (i.e., both 
have a protected IACT mark), then “first in time, first in 
right” rule should apply.360  If only one party establishes 
rights in an IACT mark, however, the adjudication court 
shall render the appropriate judgment securing that party’s 
rights in the corresponding domain name.361 
(10) Uniform Personal Jurisdiction Rule: The domestic 
legislation should also include a special uniform personal 
jurisdiction rule.  This rule should generally provide an 
adjudicating court with personal jurisdiction over a 
 
358 The same rationales and considerations discussed in principle 6 also are relevant in 
this situation, with necessary adjustments. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.  
This rule encourages filing of RDNH actions in jurisdiction(s) where the mark is a 
protected, as opposed to the Barcelona.com situation. Conversely, if registrants wish to 
avoid litigation in a foreign country (in cases where the protecting jurisdictions are 
different than their country of residence), the door is still open to file the action anywhere 
else subject to principle 10, but they compromise for a higher standard of cybersquatting 
protection. 
359 One might suggest the establishment of an appellate panel comprised of international 
experts, to which an aggrieved party may appeal only on this issue of applicable 
cybersquatting standard under the IACT rules. 
360 Namely, the registrant gets to keep the domain name registration. . 
361 In order to enforce the adjudicating court’s decision vis-à-vis registration authorities, 
is seems that close cooperation with ICANN would be necessary.  In addition, an 
ancillary rule of res judicata should be installed, giving the adjudicating court’s decision a 
binding power in any of the other member state 
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defendant (either a mark owner or registrant) in a domain 
name dispute filed under the IACT.  A defendant in such an 
IACT complaint filed in a proper venue in one of the 
member states shall be barred from bringing a personal 
jurisdiction objection.362 
In sum, the idea of the IACT is rather simple: the IACT creates 
a new legal and conceptual creature: the IACT mark.  Such mark 
would be a protected trademark under at least one member state’s 
law, but protected against cybersquatting in all member state 
jurisdictions.363 
 
362 A proliferated “proper venue” rule should be articulated in the IACT.  A proposed 
rule could be the following four-level priority scheme: (1) if the jurisdiction where the 
mark is protected and where defendant is a resident (or where personal jurisdiction can be 
otherwise obtained according to the regular domestic rules) is the same jurisdiction, then 
plaintiff should sue there; (2) if these jurisdictions are different, then plaintiff should sue 
where the defendant resides (or where personal jurisdiction is otherwise available), unless 
plaintiff is able to establish minimum contacts of defendant with the member state where 
the mark is protected, upon such case plaintiff may alternatively sue there (the test may 
be based on the U.S. minimum contacts concept or a similar one); (3) if neither of the 
above two rules apply, then plaintiff should sue where minimum contacts of the 
defendant with the member state’s jurisdiction exist; (4) if plaintiff sues in a member 
state where defendant is not a resident (and personal jurisdiction is not available), where 
the mark is not protected, and where minimum contacts do not exist, then that member 
state should nevertheless adjudicate the dispute upon a satisfactory explanation of the 
reason for suing there and upon determination that the venue was not chosen in bad faith.  
When plaintiff follows this rule, principle 10 should secure personal jurisdiction.  In the 
appropriate cases, courts may use the forum non conveniens doctrine in order to transfer 
suits to a more suitable forum. 
363 In a recent article, Professor Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Professor Jane C. Ginsburg 
presented a detailed proposal for a draft of convention on intellectual property matters 
(“Draft”). See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in 
Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.—KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002).  That proposal for an 
international convention was specifically intended to include also domain name disputes. 
Id. at 1074 (the text of article 1 of the Draft specifically includes “claims involving 
domain names.”).  The jurisdictional and adjudication solutions presented in the draft, 
however, are significantly different from the solution proposed by the IACT.  First, the 
Draft is intended also to cover myriad of intellectual property matters such as copyrights, 
neighboring rights, trademarks, unfair competition, and more. See id.  Second, the Draft 
is intended to cover disputes regarding violations occurring not only on the Internet but 
also in the off-line world. See id.  The Draft contains no language that restricts its scope 
only to on-line infringements.  Therefore, an instrument such as the IACT mark of which 
protection is limited only in the domain-names-incorporating-trademarks context would 
be inapplicable. 
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C. Testing the Model 
1. Applying Barcelona.com in an IACT Legal Framework 
After introducing the model, the Article now turns to examine 
what result in the Barcelona.com case would have been in an 
IACT world.  Assume that both the United  States and Spain are 
member states of the hypothetical IACT.  Assume further that both 
legislated essentially similar anticybersquatting laws as mandated 
by the IACT.  The City Council of Barcelona files and wins a 
UDRP proceeding, where it asserted its trademark rights under 
Spanish law in the term Barcelona.  The registrants now seek 
reversal and contemplate where to file a RDNH complaint.  If they 
sue in Spain, then the Spanish court would typically have to decide 
first whether the term Barcelona is a protected mark in Spain and 
whether the rights in the mark belong to the City Council.  If the 
court rules in the affirmative in both questions, then the court 
should further apply the Spanish anticybersquatting law and 
determine whether the registration of the domain name violated 
that law. 
Alternatively, the registrants may decide to sue in a U.S. court 
under the modified ACPA.364  According to the IACT definitions 
the U.S. court would be the adjudicating court, and the Spanish 
court would be the assisting court.  First, the U.S. court should be 
able to have in personam jurisdiction over the City Council, in 
accordance with principle 10.365  After concluding that the term 
Barcelona is not protected under U.S. law,366 a query to the proper 
court in Spain should be submitted, where the Spanish trademark 
rights in the term shall be ascertained under Spanish law.  If the 
Spanish court determines the existence of such rights, the U.S. 
 
364 That is, an ACPA that is accommodated to comply with the IACT scheme described 
above. 
365 See supra note 362 and accompanying text (discussing principle 10).  Defendant (the 
city council) is not a U.S. resident, the mark is not protected there, and it is also possible 
that there are no minimum contacts between the city and the United States.  Alternative 4, 
however, in the sliding scale described in supra note 362 may nevertheless provide 
jurisdiction, by virtue of the IACT agreement. 
366 This conclusion is reached for the same reasons delineated in the actual 
Barcelona.com decision. See discussion supra Part III.B.4. 
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court shall proceed to adjudicate the dispute according to the 
modified ACPA under the assumption that the mark is protected.  
If no such Spanish trademark rights are established, the registrants 
should keep the domain name without the need to further discuss 
cybersquatting allegations. 
Consequently, the result should be identical, regardless of 
whether the registrants elect to sue in a U.S. or Spanish court.367  
Thereby, the problems of forum shopping and the frustration felt 
by owners of foreign marks sued in the United States would be 
essentially eliminated.  Even if some of the basic assumptions are 
changed—for instance, that the cybersquatting standards are 
different in Spain compared to those in the United States—the 
applicable law would still be the higher standard of 
cybersquatting.368  That means that losing registrants in the UDRP 
proceeding would no longer have a more attractive forum that 
would entertain their RDNH claim.  Even in more internationally 
complex circumstances, the result would be essentially similar.  
The incentives to forum shop for the venue applying the most 
favorable law, both by registrants and mark owners, would 
dramatically decrease.369  Another advantage of this scheme is that 
a qualified Spanish court would decide on matters of Spanish 
trademark law, instead of a U.S. court in Virginia, struggling with 
Spanish trademark terminology, legal analysis and 
interpretation.370 
 
367 Actually, it would not really matter whether registrants alternatively elect to sue in a 
third member state’s court.  Under the Barcelona.com circumstances, it would always be 
Spanish law determining the existence of the mark and the adjudicating court’s 
cybersquatting standard applied, unless the circumstances call for application of the 
Spanish standard, where principal 7 is applicable. 
368 See supra note 357. 
369 A more complex hypothetical situation could be, for instance, a Korean registrant 
arguably cybersquatting on a Chinese mark using a Japanese registrar.  Assuming that all 
three jurisdictions adhere to the IACT, the rights in the mark would be determined in the 
three possible adjudicating courts according to Chinese law under a cybersquatting 
standard least favorable to the plaintiff or the standard of the “state of origin” (in this 
case, China).  If trademark rights of both parties can be established (e.g., the registrant 
has rights under the law of Japan and the mark owner established Chinese rights), then 
principle 9 applies; the registrant who was first to register his mark would be allowed to 
keep the domain name. 
370 The district court in the Barcelona.com dispute put itself in the shoes of a Spanish 
court, discussed Spanish trademark law, and made judicial findings applying that law. 
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2. The Game Theory Model 
Thus far, the Article contests that the ACPA RDNH provision 
unreasonably favors U.S. marks, namely, because only such marks 
have an effective defense against RDNH claims in U.S. courts.  As 
a consequence, the Article envisions some negative effects, 
including forum shopping, where owners of foreign marks are 
motivated to avoid U.S. forum while registrants are strongly 
encouraged to file RDNH actions against such owners in U.S. 
courts. 
The following numerical model examines the ACPA from a 
more general perspective, which is not limited to RDNH cases.  
While also scrutinizing the ACPA in light of its in personam and in 
rem provisions, the model attempts to show the general imbalanced 
structure of the ACPA, which facilitates a plaintiff-sensitive forum 
shopping situation.371 
In the aftermath of the Sallen and the Barcelona.com decisions, 
it appears that judicial outcomes in international cybersquatting 
disputes litigated in U.S. courts are becoming more predictable.  
Hence, under this model, numerical values are assigned to different 
world situations or scenarios. 
There are two types of rational actors participating in any 
situation evaluated by the model: registrant (R) and mark owner 
(MO).  Similar to other typical behavioral models, this model 
assumes that both actors aspire to maximize their utility and make 
informed decisions accordingly.  In addition, this model 
contemplates three variables: 
(1) Venue: The two possible alternatives are either the 
United States or Jurisdiction X. 
 
See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 
367, 371–72 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2002) 
371 Since registrants as plaintiffs will always attempt to bring RDNH actions, while 
owners as plaintiffs will exercise the in personam and in rem provisions, the general 
model also includes the RDNH problem. 
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(2) Applicable Trademark Law: The two possible 
alternatives are either U.S. law or Jurisdiction X law.372 
(3) Plaintiff: The two possible alternatives are (i) R filing a 
RDNH action after losing its registration in the UDRP (or 
through application of a similar policy);373 or (ii) MO filing 
a trademark infringement or dilution action.374 
When the mark in question is likely to be protected in the 
venue’s jurisdiction375 then the symbol (TM+) is assigned, as 
opposed to situations where the mark is not protected (TM–). 
The model further assumes that a plaintiff suing in a certain 
venue would make three types of arguments: (1) the chosen venue 
has personal jurisdiction (PJR) over the defendant;376 (2) the 
chosen venue has subject matter jurisdiction (SMJ) to adjudicate 
 
372 Trademark law in this context includes both substantive trademark protection—that 
is, general definitions of protected marks and circumstances under which protection is 
triggered—and protection against cybersquatting. 
373 For purposes of convenience, the model further refers only to the UDRP.  The 
analysis, however, should apply also to any other policy falling under the RDNH 
provision of the ACPA. 
374 Arguably, these are not the only possible world situations.  For example, registrant 
(R) may try to secure a declaratory judgment through a “preemptive lawsuit” before mark 
owner (MO) takes any measures.  The model argues, however, that this situation would 
be very rare.  The first reason is the immediate, substantial litigation costs involved.  
Rational R would try to avoid litigation absent an imminent threat to the registration.  
Even if MO files a UDRP complaint, there is still hope that R would win the UDRP 
proceeding.  Thus, it makes no sense for R to be inpatient at this early stage.  Second, 
such an action would prevent R from implementing litigation strategies, in the relevant 
situation, that would help R in directing subsequent judicial proceedings to R’s favorite 
jurisdiction.  R filing a preemptive lawsuit is generally confined to a jurisdiction where 
personal jurisdiction over MO is available.  Third, R filing a “preemptive lawsuit” is 
expected to have a significant cause of action problem.  Even the Sallen holding is not 
directly applicable where a subsequent UDRP proceeding never took place.  Fourth, 
being the first to bring a lawsuit does not seem to furnish R with a significant strategic 
advantage.  But see supra Part IV.D.3 (discussing the GlobalSantaFe case and indicating 
that in some cases of possible in rem actions in the United States, it might be important 
for R to sue first in order to overcome comity problems).  In sum, a “preemptive lawsuit” 
strategy in general is likely to be very unattractive for R, hence negligible for the purpose 
of the model. 
375 This is the case, for example, when an official trademark registration exists and 
maintained by MO. 
376 Since the model assumes international elements and interests involved in the dispute, 
it is likely that defendant would bring also a personal jurisdiction challenge. 
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the dispute;377 and; (3) plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought 
(Merits).378  In addition, the model assigns numerical values to 
each scenario: the value 1 is assigned when the plaintiff is likely to 
succeed in the argument, the value 0 is assigned when the plaintiff 
is likely not to succeed and the value 0.5 is assigned when the 
plaintiff may succeed.  Utility value (UV) is the sum value in all 
three arguments in a certain situation, while the aggregate value of 
the UVs in any one of the venues is the total utility value (TUV) of 
a certain plaintiff litigating in a certain venue. 
a) The Post-Barcelona.com World 
Table A 
R’s Alternatives in a Post-Barcelona.com World 
 
 United States Jurisdiction X 
Situation I II III IV 
TM + – + – 
PJR 0.5*(1) 0.5 (1) 0.5 (1) 0.5 (1) 
SMJ 1 1 0.5 0.5 
Merits 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
UV 2 (2.5) 2.5 (3) 1.5 (2) 1.5 (2) 
TUV 4.5 (5 .5) 3 (4) 
* The value in parenthesis is the PJR value when plaintiff employs pre-litigation 
strategies. 
 
377 That is, the venue acknowledges and renders appropriate recourse in cases of 
cybersquatting and/or RDNH claims. 
378 The nature of the merits sought and its availability depends, naturally, on the 
applicable law.  The precise remedies available for the plaintiff in the various situations is 
not a relevant parameter of the model and thus are not specified. 
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Table B  
MO’s Alternatives in a Post-Barcelona.com World 
 
 United States Jurisdiction X 
Situation I II III IV 
TM + – + – 
PJR 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
SMJ 1 0 0.5 0.5 
Merits 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 
UV 2.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 
TUV 3 3 
i. Explanation 
In situation I in table A, R is filing a complaint in a U.S. court 
under the RDNH provision of the ACPA after losing the 
registration in the UDRP.  Situation I also provides that the mark 
in question is protected under the venue’s law, i.e., the Lanham 
Act.  Since foreign elements are involved, the model assumes that 
MO would bring PJR challenge, and the chances of R’s success in 
convincing a U.S. court to exercise PJR over MO are evaluated at 
0.5.  Further, since the RDNH provision of the ACPA renders a 
certain SMJ in such a case,379 the value assigned in the relevant 
field is 1.  If R is successful in asserting personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction in the United States, and given that the mark is 
protected under the Lanham Act, R may or may not further succeed 
in showing that the registration does not violate the ACPA, hence 
the value 0.5 in the Merits field. 
Situation II in table A differs from the previous scenario only 
with respect to the validity of the mark under U.S. law.  It provides 
a scenario in which the mark is not protected under the Lanham 
Act.  In light of the outcome in the Barcelona.com, the value 1 is 
assigned in the Merits field, and the probability for R to win in 
court is very high. 
On the other hand, consider situation III in table A.  Success in 
asserting PJR and SMJ in Jurisdiction X in a RDNH claim is 
 
379 This example relies on a Sallen analysis. 
EFRONI FORMAT 12/9/2003  2:31 PM 
106 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:29 
questionable, hence the value 0.5 is assigned.380  Even if R is 
successful in both arguments, R may convince the court that the 
registration is not unlawful, even though the mark is protected 
under Jurisdiction X law.  In situation IV in table A, where the 
mark is not protected under Jurisdiction X law, the value 0.5 is still 
assigned in the Merits field because the model cannot predict 
whether the foreign court would resolve to grant cybersquatting 
protection in an RDNH claim even to non-recognized marks.381  
Finally, the values in parentheses assigned across the PJR fields of 
table A indicate that R may also use litigation strategies in order to 
increase its chances to establish personal jurisdiction over MO in 
the chosen venue, as discussed in Part II.A.2 of this Article.  Since 
“locking” MO in a certain jurisdiction dramatically increases R’s 
chances to establish PJR, the value 1 in parenthesis is assigned. 
Table B presents the possible alternatives available for MO in a 
post-Barcelona.com world.  In situation I, MO files a 
cybersquatting action against R in a U.S. court, where the mark is 
protected.  MO has value 1 in the PJR field because the model 
assumes that lack of personal jurisdiction over R does not bar a 
cybersquatting action in the United States.382  MO has value 1 also 
in the SMJ field383 and value 0.5 in the Merits field.384  In situation 
 
380 Subject matter jurisdiction for losing registrants should not be taken for granted in 
any given jurisdiction.  Some jurisdictions may consider the UDRP as arbitration and 
refuse to interfere (or, altogether refuse to acknowledge any cause of action providing 
redress to R in such circumstances).  For instance, in the United States it took the 
legislation of the ACPA and the ruling of Sallen to establish such subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In addition, one U.S. appellate court has held that the UDRP is not a 
proceeding falling under the Federal Arbitration Act. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 
365, 371–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the UDRP proceedings do not fall under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, thus the court was not limited to that act’s constrains on UDRP 
judicial review). 
381 The Barcelona.com district court believed that the ACPA affords such protection. 
See 189 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373–74 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d and vacated, 330 F.3d 617 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
382 When personal jurisdiction in the United States cannot be ascertained, MO is likely 
to invoke the in rem provision. See supra Parts II.B.2, IV.D (providing discussions on the 
ACPA in rem provision and indicating that in rem jurisdiction is available when in 
personam jurisdiction cannot be established).  Since the gTLD registries, by and large, 
are located in U.S. territory, MO using the in rem provision is very likely to succeed in 
establishing basis for jurisdiction in the United States. 
383 This is provided by the ACPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
384 The result depends of MO’s ability to establish its ACPA claims. 
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II in table B, MO is likely to be required by a U.S. court to 
establish personal jurisdiction over R, since the ACPA in rem 
provision is not available when a foreign mark is involved, hence 
the value 0.5.385  Further, the model assumes that the ACPA does 
not protect non-U.S. marks, therefore the value 0 appears in the 
SMJ field.386  Absent a U.S. recognized mark, and failing to 
establish SMJ, MO has practically zero chance to win the merits of 
a cybersquatting claim under the ACPA.387  Table B further 
presents MO’s values in Jurisdiction X according to the same 
principles.388  Tables A(a) and B(b) below presents the UV results 
of Tables A and B, respectively. 
Table A(a)  
R’s UV in a Post-Barcelona.com World 
 
Jurisdiction X  
+ – 
+ 2 / 1.5 2 / 1.5 United 
States – 2.5 / 1.5 2.5 / 1.5 
 
Table B(b) 
MO’s UV in a Post-Barcelona.com World 
 
Jurisdiction X  
+ – 
+ 2.5 / 1.5 2.5 / 1.5 United 
States – 0.5 / 1.5 0.5 / 1.5 
 
385 See supra note 235 (indicating that the in rem provision covers only U.S. protected 
marks). 
386 But see supra note 262 (discussing an alternative reading of the ACPA). 
387 See id. 
388 In situations III and IV in table B, territorial jurisdiction is always uncertain.  
Further, MO is assigned the value 0.5 in the SMJ fields, since it is questionable whether 
Jurisdiction X recognizes its cause of action absent of legislation similar to the ACPA 
and/or other legal bases providing cybersquatting protection.  In situation IV in table B, 
MO holds no trademark rights under Jurisdiction X law.  The model, however, cannot 
predict whether Jurisdiction X affords cybersquatting protection even when the mark is 
not recognized under its trademark system. 
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ii. Analysis 
The results unequivocally affirm the basic assumption of a 
plaintiff-sensitive forum shopping situation.  Table A shows that R 
has a significant positive incentive (+1.5) to litigate in the United 
States.389  In addition, table A(a) indicates that R has such 
motivation regardless of the nature of trademark rights 
involved.390  Table A further shows that R, implementing litigation 
strategy, is increasing his TUV in both the United States and 
Jurisdiction X.391 
Table B shows that MO is technically indifferent between 
litigating in the United States or in Jurisdiction X.392  A closer look 
at table B(b), however, reveals that MO’s decision is highly 
dependent on the “nationality” of the mark.  Table B(b) shows that 
MO is expected to favor the U.S. forum in two out of four possible 
situations—only when a U.S. mark is involved.  Hence, MO should 
always favor a U.S. forum when it holds a U.S. mark.  
Additionally the UV difference between situation I in table B 
(having U.S. mark) and situation II in table B (having foreign 
mark) is very significant.393 
The conclusion derived from tables A and B is that Rs should 
always favor bringing RDNH actions in U.S. courts,394 while MOs 
should also favor the U.S. forum, but only when defending U.S. 
marks.  Another interesting aspect of the model can be 
demonstrated by combining the results of tables A(a) and B(b).  It 
appears that plaintiffs in general are expected to favor a U.S. forum 
in six out of eight possible scenarios.  Assuming that every 
scenario has the same probability to occur, the model suggests that 
plaintiffs are expected to favor litigation in the United States in 
 
389 The total utility value (TUV) is 4.5 compared to only 3 in Jurisdiction X. 
390 In all four possible alternatives R’s utility value (UV) is higher in the United States 
than in Jurisdiction X. 
391 The TUV is 5.5 in the United States, and 4 in Jurisdiction X, compared to 4.5 and 3, 
respectively. 
392 MO has TUV 3 in both venues. 
393 In situation I in table B, the UV is 2.5.  In situation II, the UV is only 0.5. 
394 This assumes sterility of the scenario, namely that only the three arguments of 
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and merits are controlling R’s litigation 
decision. 
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approximately seventy-five percent of the cases.395  This finding 
indicates that the ACPA has the potential of becoming a 
“plaintiffs’ magnet” in cybersquatting disputes.396 
b) The IACT World 
Table C 
R’s Alternatives in an IACT World 
 
 United States Jurisdiction X 
Situation I II III IV 
TM + – + – 
PJR 1 1 1 1 
SMJ 1 1 1 1 
Merits 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
UV 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
TUV 5 5 
Table D 
MO’s Alternatives in an IACT World 
 
 United States Jurisdiction X 
Situation I II III IV 
TM + – + – 
PJR 1 1 1 1 
SMJ 1 1 1 1 
Merits 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
UV 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
TUV 5 5 
i. Explanation 
Tables C and D present a reality possible in a world adhering to 
the IACT regime.  In table C, R files a RDNH action in either the 
United States or Jurisdiction X and is likely to have in both 
 
395 6 x 0.125 = 0.75. 
396 This conclusion correlates with a previous finding indicating that the vast majority of 
court-challenged UDRP decisions are litigated in the U.S. courts. See supra note 316 and 
accompanying text.  This correlation, however, does not necessarily suggest that the 
situation described by the model is the only explanation for that finding. 
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jurisdictions PJR and SMJ afforded by the IACT.397  Moreover, no 
matter whether the mark in question is potentially protected in the 
United States, in Jurisdiction X, in both, or in neither, R only may 
succeed on the merits, therefore the value 0.5 assigned.398  
Regarding the merits question, the adjudicating court’s 
cybersquatting standard is generally applied,399 while the 
substantive trademark laws applied in deciding whether the mark is 
an IACT mark are U.S. law, Jurisdiction X law, or both.400  The 
situation is essentially identical from MO’s perspective.  It should 
be able to assert personal and subject matter jurisdictions in 
cybersquatting claims in any member state, and without regard to 
whether the adjudicating member state substantively recognizes 
the mark.  MO’s success on the merits depends on showing that (1) 
MO holds an IACT mark; (2) R does not hold an IACT mark; and 
(3) registration is unlawful under the applicable cybersquatting 
standard. 
ii. Analysis 
Tables C and D clearly present meaningful change of positions 
of potential plaintiffs.  Regardless of the nature of the trademark 
rights involved and regardless of the venue adjudicating the 
dispute, plaintiffs, both R and MO, have the same UVs and TUVs. 
Namely, tables C and D show that plaintiffs, in any possible 
scenario of cybersquatting disputes, are venue indifferent. 
This result is achievable because the subject matter jurisdiction 
and the personal jurisdiction problems are solved uniformly by the 
IACT structure in a vast majority of possible situations.  The IACT 
system would have a substantial impact on several negative aspects 
of the present scheme.  First, an identical UV in all jurisdictions, 
regardless of the nationality of the mark or the type of plaintiff, is 
 
397 Subject matter jurisdiction is afforded by virtue of the anti-cybersquatting legislation 
provided according to principle 1.  In addition, R should not experience difficulties in 
establishing personal jurisdiction, absent of bad faith situation, in accordance with 
principle 10. 
398 Compare this with situation II in tables A and B, where the merits values are 1 and 0, 
respectively. See supra Part V.C.2 tbls. A, B. 
399 The standard is generally applied in accordance with principle 3, but subject to the 
choice of law principles. 
400 The applicable trademark law depends on the nature of the trademark rights asserted 
by MO. 
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expected to discourage plaintiffs from attempting to direct the 
dispute to the national courts most suitable for their needs.  
Additionally, since the result in the various national courts depends 
on similar considerations, the motivation to employ litigation 
strategies by exploiting the ill-structured UDRP procedural rules 
should disappear.  Furthermore, the IACT scheme, through its 
choice of law principles, decreases the potential benefits for 
plaintiffs to forum shop under protective standards applied in 
different member states.401 
Second, the laundry machine effect402 in RDNH cases 
involving foreign marks litigated in U.S. courts under the ACPA 
disappears.  Since under the IACT, U.S. courts must recognize and 
enforce foreign trademarks that constitute IACT marks for the 
limited purpose of preventing cybersquatting, owners of these 
marks would no longer stand in U.S. courts without redress.  
Clearly, in an IACT world no other member state would be 
allowed to legislate a scheme that results in the laundry machine 
effect of U.S. or foreign marks.  In such a world, the concept of 
fairness is better served, and national courts are expected to 
experience less difficulty in consolidating international comity 
principles and national cybersquatting schemes. 
Third, owners of foreign marks are no longer endangering their 
long-term interests by filing a UDRP (or any other similar policy) 
complaint.  The partial reverse effect,403 contemplating the 
apprehension of owners of foreign marks from filing UDRP 
complaints in a post-Barcelona.com reality, is no longer a valid 
concern.  Absent of disfavoring treatment in U.S. courts, the 
possible exercise of the ACPA’s RDNH provision is not 
substantially different than a UDRP review in any other member 
state’s national court. 
Finally, the IACT system could help in preventing litigation 
races.  Such a phenomenon is a valid concern bearing some 
consequences where different national legal schemes have possible 
 
401 See supra text accompanying 253–54 (discussing principles 6 and 7). 
402 See supra Part IV.D.4. 
403 See supra Part IV.C.3 (describing a contemplated phenomenon of foreign owners 
avoiding the UDRP and by doing so trying to avoid the long arm of the RDNH 
provision). 
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application on a single dispute.  In this context, when comity 
allows404 the first court where the case was bought to adjudicate 
the dispute, parties are discouraged from turning to litigation 
alternatives first.405  Moreover, the increase in certainty provided 
by the IACT system regarding litigation outcomes should result in 
a reduction of cybersquatting litigation volume in general, and 
encourage parties to turn first to alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
It is important to note that an IACT scheme does not render the 
UDRP meaningless or unnecessary.  The UDRP may remain an 
important mechanism providing a fast, cheap, and effective 
solution in simple and straightforward cases of cybersquatting.  
When disputes are no longer simple and straightforward, the IACT 
scheme also may be considered as providing a legitimate appeal or 
judicial review forum on UDRP decisions.  Unlike the present 
judicial review option, however, which is highly forum-sensitive, 
applicable law-sensitive and subject to potential manipulations and 
strategies, an IACT forum adjudication is none of the above.  
Consequently, the UDRP may transform from a forum shopping 
and RDNH engine into a component in a system that is designed, 
inter alia, to thwart these problems. 
Chicago-Kent Law Professor Graeme B. Dinwoodie concluded 
that “[t]he rules that will control the allocation and use of domain 
names . . . will inevitably (and perhaps appropriately) reflect laws 
that are national, international, and supranational in nature.  They 
will be developed in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial fora that 
are national, international, and supranational in nature.”406  
Concurring with this observation, it might be said that the IACT 
scheme is making one step in this direction.  The IACT represents 
a solution that is no more than an essential combination of national 
 
404 In this context, comity means in accordance with certain courts’ in rem jurisdiction 
rules. 
405 See supra Part IV.D.3 (discussing the “litigation race” as a consequence of the first-
in-right rule as applied in GlobalSantaFe). 
406 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain 
Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 521 (2000). 
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laws, an international treaty, and preliminary supranational 
mechanisms in place.407 
D. Why Should the IACT Be Attractive to Internet Nations? 
1. Everyone Gets a Slice of the Pie 
The analysis laid out in this Article suggests that an IACT 
scheme has the potential of solving many of the present scheme’s 
shortcomings.  Realistically, it is important to consider whether the 
IACT would provide an advantageous and attractive alternative to 
any national player involved.  The argument is that an IACT 
structure should be, in many respects, attractive both to the United 
States and to other foreign states.  More specifically, foreign 
countries’ incentive to join an IACT of which the United States is a 
member state is clear; trademark rights protected under their laws 
would no longer have high potential to receive disfavoring 
treatment by  a U.S. court deciding on cybersquatting disputes 
under the ACPA.  Owners of foreign marks would no longer be 
“stripped” of their trademark rights in RDNH cases in U.S. 
courts.408  Additionally, many of the concerns regarding the ACPA 
in rem provision and its potential adverse effect on foreign 
interests should diminish under an IACT structure.409  
Consequently, some highly problematic countermeasures such as 
the legislation of competing national anticybersqatting laws or the 
creation of a competing DNS infrastructure altogether, would not 
be necessary in this context.410 
 
407 Dinwoodie asserted that “[t]he UDRP holds the promise of supranational laws and 
supranational adjudication.” Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).  In this respect, the UDRP (or 
any other similar international dispute resolution mechanism concerning rights in domain 
names) is the supranational aspect of the general IACT scheme, providing limited 
solutions in limited types of fact patterns. 
408 The city council argued in Barcelona.com that adjudicating the dispute only 
according to U.S. law would strip a trademark owner of its foreign rights whenever it is 
hauled into court by a U.S. domain name owner who has lost a UDRP administrative 
proceeding. See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 
F.3d 617, 622–23 (4th Cir. 2003). 
409 See discussion supra Parts II.B.2, IV.D. 
410 See discussion supra Part IV.E (discussing some possible foreign reactions to U.S. 
policy in regulating and adjudicating domain name registrations). 
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On the other hand, the United States may also find the IACT to 
be a better alternative.  It would reduce the antagonism and 
negative sentiments emerging in other countries toward its 
rulemaking policy and courts.411  Additionally, preventing various 
types of foreign reaction, motivated by those sentiments, would 
also serve U.S. interests.412  Finally, the United States in particular 
should benefit from the expected general reduction in the volume 
of cybersquatting litigation.  Such general reduction is likely to 
ease the burden of caseload on U.S federal courts, especially the 
ones in Virginia.  Regarding disputes that nevertheless end up in 
court, a more internationally oriented scheme, affording plaintiffs 
with the opportunity to bring the dispute in any member state’s 
court without risking their interests, would distribute adjudication 
more proportionally between the jurisdictions involved. 
2. IACT Critique 
The IACT is, by no means, a perfect solution to international 
domain name disputes.  Some problematic aspects are yet to be 
solved.  For example, the minimum standard concept mandated by 
principle 2 is expected to cause concerns among some potential 
member states.  Generally speaking, reaching an international 
consensus regarding any kind of intellectual property standard of 
protection has proven hard to achieve.413  Different counties have 
different views about the nature and purpose of intellectual 
property laws.  In the case of trademarks, U.S. law is aimed at 
protecting consumers against confusion and aggressively 
protecting the proprietary interests of mark owners, driven by the 
desire to encourage entrepreneurship, investments, and individual 
efforts.  On the other hand, in countries like Japan, intellectual 
property policy is generally driven by commitments toward 
collective benefits and progress of the nation as a whole.414  
 
411 See Rains, supra note 335. 
412 See supra Part V.A (analyzing the U.S. unilateral approach as a lose-lose situation). 
413 See generally Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in 
International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 277 (2001) (investigating the global intellectual property rights 
regime with a specific focus on the process of international consensus building). 
414 Yonehara, supra note 331, at 213–14 (describing the policy rationales of Japanese 
intellectual property laws). 
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Different views about the role of trademark law created different 
legal definitions of marks and dictated a different scope and type 
of protection.  Such differences may render an internationally 
accepted minimum standard an evasive concept.415 
Another thorny issue, relevant in any attempt to regulate 
domain name registration, is the issue of well-known marks.416  
The proposed IACT does not distinguish between marks on basis 
of their strength.  Principle 9 sets the first-in-time rule, providing 
that when two IACT marks are competing on the same domain 
name, the first mark owner to register wins.  That means that 
domain name registration of a lesser known mark recognized by 
one of the member states would prevail over a claim of a well-
known mark regarding the registration as long as the lesser known 
mark registered the domain name first.  There is no easy solution 
to this problem, especially since it goes down to the heart of the 
controversy regarding the appropriate scope of trademark 
protection, particularly in the context of the Internet, where domain 
names are global and unique.417 
 
415 A prominent attempt to reach internationally accepted standards on this issue was 
made in WIPO’s 1999 report on Internet domain names. See WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 355, ¶¶ 129–204.  The enforcement of the WIPO recommendation (after some 
revisions and modification), however, was effectuated by ICANN not by virtue of 
international consensus, but because of ICANN’s control over the domain name system. 
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the adoption of the UDRP by ICANN and its imposition 
through registration agreements on all gTLD registrations). 
416 The Lanham Act terminology for a well-known mark is “famous mark.” See 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).  Famous marks are protected against uses that “cause[] 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” Id.  Under the Lanham Act, dilution can 
occur even when there is no likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. See id. 
 § 1127 (defining “dilution”).  The FTDA added to the Lanham Act a non-exhaustive list 
of circumstances, helping courts to determine whether a mark in question is famous or 
not. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H).  In international fora, article 16(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, referring to article 6bis of the Paris Convention, mandates that “[i]n 
determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the 
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in 
the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the 
trademark.” TRIPS, supra note 351, art. 16(2).  Article 16(3) extends protection of well-
known marks also to use in “goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of 
which a trademark is registered.” Id. art. 16(3). 
417 The WIPO Final Report devoted a detailed and lengthy analysis to this problem. See 
WIPO FINAL REPORT, supra note 355, ¶¶ 245–303.  It suggested creating a priority 
scheme that would favor well-known or famous marks in registration under some or all 
the gTLDs. Id. ¶¶ 276–303.  This recommendation, however, was not adopted by ICANN 
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Despite these problems and perhaps some others that are not 
discussed here, this Article argues that crafting an IACT, tailored 
around the ten principles described above, is partially achievable.  
There are three major reasons supporting this argument.  First, the 
IACT does not interfere with national substantive trademark 
protection.  In other words, a member state should be free to keep 
its substantive trademark law framework unchanged—most 
importantly, its definition and scope of marks eligible 
protection.418  Next, a member state should not be required to 
automatically grant full protection to marks that are protected by 
other member states.  Protection of non-recognized IACT marks 
extends only to adjudication of domain name disputes, no more 
and no less.  A final reason supporting the IACT’s achievability is 
that especially today, when the shortcomings of the present system 
are no longer merely theoretical or academic but real and acute, 
there is hope that Internet nations will show more flexibility and 
motivation in bridging the controversies and crafting together a 
new, better platform for international dispute resolution, at least in 
the context of domain names. 
CONCLUSION 
The Barcelona.com decision is a correct application of a 
problematic law.  It contributes to the formulation of legal reality 
in which U.S. federal courts, in some situations, constitute a 
friendly forum to U.S. mark owners and potential cybersquatters of 
foreign marks.  At the same time, U.S. federal courts are becoming 
hostile to owners of foreign marks trying to protect their marks 
against cybersquatting under the ACPA RDNH provision.  Such 
reality is likely to bring about many worrisome developments in 
the near future.  On the individual, small-scale level, which may 
evolve into a general trend, the possible result could be that parties 
 
and thus, was not included in the UDRP. See Froomkin, supra note 69, at 632 (noting that 
ICANN did not adopt WIPO’s proposal regarding a pre-emptive protection to famous or 
well-known marks).  In some gTLDs, however, ICANN implemented a “sunrise” policy, 
which gave all trademark holders some sort of pre-emptive registration rights. Id. at 632 
n.91. 
418 Clearly, some trademark protection would be a prerequisite for joining the IACT 
structure. See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
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to international domain name disputes would direct litigation to the 
forum that entertains their claims according to domestic, favorable 
rules.  Given the present physical structure of the Internet and the 
structure of Internet-related rules, however, a large-scale reaction 
of other Internet nations may bring about even more troubling and 
radical results.  The outcome in the Barcelona.com case underlines 
the faults of a unilateral approach to domain name regulation and 
adjudication.  That approach has proven itself to be inadequate, 
bearing myriad negative ramifications.  At the same time, the 
Barcelona.com decision reemphasizes the need for an international 
collaboration in the battle against cybersquatting activities.  The 
proposal for the International Anticybersquatting Treaty represents 
an alternative approach that should better serve the underlining 
objective of fairly and adequately adjudicating international 
cybersquatting disputes. 
 
